The coming bank consolidation... but not why you might think.

If I had a nickel for every time an investment banker predicted the mass consolidation of our industry I could buy a free round to all attendees at next month's Financial Managers' Society Forum. Financial Institutions need greater scale to offset the rising regulatory burden imposed by Dodd-Frank and soon to be imposed by the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB) is the most often cited reason.

But I have noticed a couple of trends that may be a better leading indicator of coming FI consolidations, one old and one new.

Old

The old reason is that our CEOs are old... pun intended. Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, we prognosticators used to look at CEOs age as an indication of whether a financial institution would sell. See the table for the average age of FI leadership for publicly traded banks and thrifts.  It tells a challenging story... one quarter of FI CEO's are two years from retirement. Half are seven years away. Are there successors in the wings?

I have not read one press release announcing a merger that stated: "Our CEO is old, we have nobody to replace him, so we sold." But the cynic in me says this reason stands tall in prominence in the Board meeting when the sale decision is made.

This could be because the CEO does a good job, and neither the CEO or the Board thinks there is another potential CEO candidate that can do as well. If this is the case, then I put to you that neither the CEO nor the Board has done a very good job of developing leadership in the organization making successful next- generation passing of the baton doubtful. The cynic in me suspects there may be no opportunity for the retiring CEO to unlock the value of his investment in the FI without a sale.

But there are exceptions, such as how Wayne Bank in Honesdale, Pennsylvania implemented a leadership change flawlessly. Bill Davis, a great banker who never thought the success of the bank was all about him, moved out of the executive suite on retirement day and passed leadership to his second in command, who had been groomed from within. See the link below for the jfb post on Bill Davis.

New

The newfangled reason for the coming consolidation wave, in my opinion, is the change in our shareholder base (see chart). Community FIs used to have very predictable shareholders. They were typically within our communities, liked the dividend, and were proud to own a piece of their local bank.

Having gone through a few consolidation waves, our shareholders have become more diverse. They're also becoming older, and many have already passed shares to the next generation that lacks that same connection to the bank.

Lastly and possibly more importantly, FIs have needed capital during the past few years as loan problems and operating losses have reduced industry capital ratios. We turned to the most prominent underwriters of community FI stock, Sandler O'Neill, KBW, and Stifel to replenish our capital coffers. Where do these underwriters place the community bank issues? With institutional shareholders such as asset managers, hedge funds, and the like.

These institutional shareholders have little interest in what you think you mean to your communities or employees. They plug in the number they bought into your shares, and expect a certain return. If you can't deliver the return via profitability, then you better sell to give it to them. These shareholders at times own a relatively large percentage of a stock that doesn't trade heavily. In these instances, it would be difficult for the institutional shareholder to exit the stock through any other means than a sale.

Yes, those that successfully raised capital in the past two years are proud that they have done so. But I wonder if, while basking in the glow of that success, they understand that they may have sealed their fate far in advance?

Do you think there will be an increase in FI consolidations? Why or why not?

~ Jeff

Ode to Bill Davis:

http://jeff-for-banks.blogspot.com/2010/02/ode-to-bill-davis.html

Four Not-So-Serious Don'ts for Financial Institutions

Movies tell great stories. Most times they exaggerate real life. So I am pouncing on the opportunity to over-dramatize four things I don't think FI's should do.

1. Don't ignore your CEOs age. Prognosticators are predicting incredible shrinkage in community FIs because of regulatory burden. I think it is equally likely that boards throw in the towel because their CEO is far closer to the grave than the cradle, like Aunt Edna from National Lampoon's Vacation. Don't prop your CEO on top of your family truckster.

Note: I wanted to use the "You're my boy, Blue" clip from Old School. But in the movie Blue passed while wrestling sorority girls in a tub of KY Jelly, and I thought it may be a wee-bit inappropriate. But I really, really wanted to use that clip.

2. Don't implement a sales culture that results in no more than product pushing. There are many variants of sales culture. Many FIs went for the worst, the used car salesman variety. If your customers visit your website or branch, and the best you have to say is "yeah, she's a beauty, I can see you behind the wheel, wind blowing in your hair", you better revisit your strategy. We don't want product pushers like Kathy Bates selling squirrels in Rat Race, do we?

3. Don't let Bloomberg radio or the New York Times build your brand. We're taking it on the chin by mass media and it's time to stop the madness. Letting others define who you are may lead to tremendous misunderstandings, such as how Jon Lovitz's family was portrayed in Rat Race to a gathering of World War II vets.

4.  Don't "pants" your regulators. I, myself, have peaked into clients' conference rooms at the young-gun examiners and wanted to give them a Three Stooges slap or two. There are some distasteful things we must do in business, and treating our exam team like industry professionals during a time when they seem to be out to get us is one of them. Don't "pants" them as in this Meatballs clip.

Three Banking Lessons Learned from Girls Lacrosse

Several months ago I was enlisted to coach middle school girls lacrosse. It is a relatively new sport to our area, so my learning curve was steep. We are nearing the end of our season, and yesterday we completed our first double header sweep. As I reflected on how far the girls have come, I thought of the lessons we learned along the way. These lessons apply to many areas of life, including the banking profession. I would like to share them with you.

1.  Stack the D

Easter weekend we played a game with a thin roster as many of our players had family commitments. Lacrosse is often referred to as the fastest sport on two feet, correctly implying a great amount of running. With limited substitutes, this puts pressure on the players on the field to perform while being gassed. Midfielders run coast to coast, so I had to be creative in substituting and switching player positions on the field.  In so doing, I weakened our defensive unit by moving key defensive players to midfield and middies back to D so they can rest. What I learned was that not adequately protecting our goal can lead to terrible results.

Most financial institutions are not lacking for customers. If we tallied up all customers that do business with us, a likely conclusion may be what one bank CEO stated as "there is enough 'there' there". I have been in countless meetings that the head of retail wonders why their total number of checking accounts remained stagnant while their monthly production reports show great progress in new account acquisition. The reason... customers walking out the back door while the FI tracks new customers coming in the front.  A classic tale of not stacking the D and defending your goal. Pay attention to the customers you have, and you will get more business from them.

2.  Win in Practice

How you practice drives your game performance. Lacrosse is a sport won in the trenches. If you win the draws, be first to pick up the ground balls (see photo), and disrupt opponent passes you will be successful. But having better skills than your opponent is not bestowed upon you by a higher power, as some may think. To consistently put passes on your teammates stick requires that you do so hundreds of times in practice.

The same goes for serving FI customers. If you are to tailor a solution to a business customer, it is critical you understand his or her needs, their industry, and general economic conditions. Having done your homework allows you to bring a greater amount of value to customers, an imperative in a competitive industry where one FI's money is as green as the bank down the street. If you want to solidify existing customers and win new ones, you better get serious about practice.

3.  Find the Hidden Gems

I found it difficult not to make quick judgments about my players. This girl is slow, that one is athletic, etc. To deny that we judge people with minimal information is to ignore human nature. During the course of the season, some of my early judgments proved wrong... dead wrong.  Some girls worked hard in practice, improved their skills quickly, and began making significant game contributions. This reminded me that Chase Utley and Michael Jordan were each cut from their high school teams.

Within your employee base there are unpolished gems waiting to shine. It is incumbent on us to identify them, encourage (yes, coach) them, train them, and let them show their brilliance. Most companies have varied levels of employees from stars to, well, not-so-much stars. Often, potential stars are kept under wraps by supervisors that want to keep them for themselves, co-workers that are paranoid about a star's brilliance, and general mediocrity that tends to keep people down. Do you reward mediocrity or protect so-so employees? Do stars receive a 4% raise while not-so-much stars get a 3% raise? Does longevity count more than performance?  These are some common ways that FIs keep potential hidden gems from shining.

Summary

In a rapidly changing industry, we frequently look outside of our organization to transform our FI for a sustainable future. But the lessons I learned by coaching youth lacrosse can be applied to your FI... there are opportunities to transform ourselves by looking within. First, by defending our market share and customer base we can reduce attrition and increase the amount of business we do with current customers... Stacking the D. Secondly, in a highly commoditized industry we can differentiate ourselves by being better prepared than competitors... Winning in Practice. Lastly, when product differentiation and cost leadership is difficult, as it is in our industry, then we must find and develop our best employees to elevate our game... Finding the Hidden Gems.

~ Jeff

Does your bank achieve positive operating leverage?

When a significant portion of your cost structure is fixed, then growing revenues should generate positive operating leverage... the cost of generating the next $100 of revenue should be less expensive than generating the previous $100.  This fundamental logic stands behind the banking industry buzzphrase, economies of scale. The fixed cost of your IT infrastructure is less on a relative basis for a $1 billion in assets financial institution (FI) than a $500 million in assets FI.

Because it is intuitive, doesn't make it so. Over the course of the past 10 years, the number of FDIC-insured FIs decreased by 23% (see chart). The average asset size per institution increased from $753 million to $1.7 billion. Clearly, part of this consolidation wave was attributable to FIs striving for economies of scale and positive operating leverage.

Has this consolidation, partly designed to give surviving institutions scale so they can spread relatively fixed costs over a larger franchise, resulted in positive operating leverage? My research into the subject says no.

One measure of achieving positive operating leverage is the efficiency ratio, defined as operating expense divided by the result of net interest income plus fee income. The lower the efficiency ratio, the greater the profitability. As an institution grows and is able to spread costs over a larger base, the efficiency ratio should go down.

But over the past ten years, efficiency ratios have risen in every asset category in both banks and thrifts with the exception of the very largest (>$10B in assets) banks (see charts).

The efficiency ratio measures how much in operating expense it takes to generate a dollar of revenue. So what if revenues (net interest margin, or fee income) are on the decline? Naturally, the efficiency ratio will go up. To further isolate expenses, I reviewed how expense ratios, defined as operating expenses divided by average assets, fared for our industry (see chart).

For banks, expense ratios have not budged during the period that resulted in a 23% reduction in FIs. Thrift expense ratios rose materially. I reviewed my company's bank and thrift product profitability reports to see if operating expenses per account declined during the 2000-2010 period. The answer: not one spread product group showed a decline in annualized cost per account. Not one.

Let's look at a couple of highly acquisitive FIs to see if they are achieving positive operating leverage by growing their balance sheets through mergers.

Fifth Third Bancorp

Fifth Third Bancorp is a $110 billion in assets financial institution with 1,363 branches and is headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio. It has made six acquisitions totaling $32.6 billion in acquired assets between 2000 and 2007. The largest acquisition by far was the second quarter 2001 acquisition of Old Kent Financial, a $22.5 billion in assets bank. I chose this period to offset any impact from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Clearly Fifth Third undertook acquisitions to achieve economies of scale. Relevant statistics during this period include:

While Fifth Third’s assets grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 13.5%, earnings per share grew at a 1.1% CAGR and both the efficiency and expense ratios were higher in 2007 than when the bank was $45 billion in assets in 2000. Positive operating leverage should result in EPS growing faster than asset size because adding the next $100 in assets should cost less than the previous $100. Has Fifth Third achieved positive operating leverage by more than doubling the size of the bank during the measurement period?

 

 

BB&T

 

BB&T is a $157 billion in assets financial institution with 1,791 branches headquartered in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. It made 21 acquisitions totaling $44.6 billion in acquired assets from 2000 through 2007.  BB&T acquired more, and often smaller, financial institutions during the measurement period than Fifth Third.  Relevant statistics include:

 

While BB&T’s assets grew at a CAGR of 12.2%, earnings per share grew at 10.8%. But the efficiency ratio remained relatively steady in spite of BB&T’s net interest margin falling from 4.20% in 2000 to 3.46% in 2007. The expense ratio declined, realizing economies of scale from its asset growth. Although EPS did not exceed asset growth, the culprit lies more in revenue generation than on realizing efficiencies from growth.

This analysis is a simple undertaking to determine if your financial institution is getting the results you want when executing a growth strategy to achieve economies of scale and positive operating leverage. If your results more closely resemble Fifth Third’s than BB&T’s, you should ask yourself why.

Economies of scale should result in lower efficiency and expense ratios, and greater profitability… i.e. positive operating leverage. If you are growing to spread relatively fixed costs over a greater revenue base, then you should measure to determine if you are succeeding. Success should result in better results to peer, industry benchmarks, and downward trends in operating costs per account. Growing absent success in these metrics means you are simply managing a more complex organization for no additional benefit. 

   

Do you measure and hold yourself accountable for reducing relative costs as you grow?

 

~ Jeff

 

Note: The above post was excerpted from a soon to be published Financial Managers Society (FMS) white paper drafted by the author.

Enterprise-wide Risk Management (ERM): Yawn

I attended an industry presentation on ERM this past week put on by RSM McGladrey.  The topic highly interested me, not because it is interesting, but because everybody is talking about it and there are differing opinions about what to do about it. What an opportunity for a non-audit, non-compliance, non-IT, and non-credit blogger to write about it!

First I would like to say that the McGladrey speaker really knew his stuff and was balanced. So often I hear commentary on ERM by advocates that think it is the next best thing to, say, online banking. Well, no it isn't. It is not likely to make your FI a lick of money. That said, here is my criteria for an ERM program:

"A successful ERM will result in reduced losses that exceed the investment made in the ERM program."

~ jeff for banks

Why else would an FI embark on ERM? If the investment in ERM exceeds losses foregone, then don't invest in an ERM program. It's not worth the money. As community FIs, regulators force us to throw enough money down a black hole without us volunteering to do so.

But managing risk across organizational silos is highly fragmented in FIs. It makes sense to coordinate the effort into one area. Perhaps, as suggested by one attendee at the presentation, ERM could streamline risk management efforts to make reporting more relevant, less voluminous, and less labor intensive. If this was a by-product of ERM, then I'm in! I think your Board of Directors (Trustees for CUs) would appreciate reducing the size of monthly Board reports for monitoring risk.

An organization's risk profile looks like the bubble chart below from McGladrey's presentation. But not all risks are equal. If we were to quantify risk across the industry, Credit Risk would rank at 10 for greatest risk (on a hypothetical scale of 1 to 10), but other significant risks would be much lower such as Liquidity and Interest Rate Risk (perhaps 4's). How would a non-audit, non-compliance, non-credit person develop a ranking system for risks?

Look at past experience to determine levels of risk. For example, perform a lookback over a meaningful sample period (perhaps 10 years, or at least one economic cycle) to identify where your FI actually lost money. A second criteria could be to query your personnel with the greatest knowledge of the risk to quantify the possible loss and the likely loss from a certain risk. By developing such a discipline, the FI should determine how much resources, if any, should be dedicated to mitigating the risk.

The bubble chart above contains too much in the form of risk categories, as most categories have sub-risks. The McGladrey presenter mentioned having 20-25 risks worth monitoring and mitigating, although he was not married to it. As ERM evolves, we have to guard against monitoring so many risks that the processes that result are inefficient in their application and ineffective at preventing those risks that represent the greatest potential loss.

For example, I was evaluating processes in a client's deposit operations function where one of the ladies in the department sorted through a large stack of checks for two hours each day. I asked why she did it. She said the Bank had a check fraud about seven years ago, and therefore she had to manually review all checks over $5,000. I asked what a fraud might look like. She didn't seem clear. I asked how many she has prevented since the undertaking. She said none.

Here was an FI that allocates two employee hours per day to prevent a fraud that she probably would not prevent. The investment in resources significantly outsized the risk. I put to you that this example will be all too familiar if we implement ERM without evaluating the size and likelihood of risk. And processes, like government programs, last forever.

This past economic cycle made clear that the single greatest risk FIs face is credit risk. I don't see this changing. Even FIs that failed due to liquidity had their woes start with credit risk, including the credit risk in the FIs investment portfolio. So let's not fool ourselves into thinking that somehow "employee fraud", or some other risk, ranks nearly as high.

But there are risks that can have materially negative impacts on our business. So a CEO and Board can efficiently and effectively monitor the greatest risks to the safety and soundness of the FI, consider implementing a well thought out ERM that is focused, efficient, and effective.

Any thoughts on what such an ERM program would look like?

~ Jeff

Product Profitability Anyone? The JFB Pro-Growth Matrix

A bank attorney spoke at a recent Financial Managers' Society (FMS) meeting that I attended. His topic: Leadership. His thesis: Analytics should be the basis for strategic decision making. He offered an interesting fact: 40% of critical decisions in U.S. companies are made from the gut. This style of decision making was romanticized by Jack Welch in his popular 2001 book: Jack Straight from the Gut.

But in reading Welch's tome regarding his successful years at the helm of GE, it is clear that he was far more analytical than the book's title indicates.

Community FI's are similar to other companies in their strategic decision making. Often, critical decisions are made from the gut or based on past experience that becomes more irrelevant as industries, such as ours, rapidly transform. Such disruption gave rise to strategic advisory firms that break down strategic decisions to the facts important to increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes.

One such firm is the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), creator of the Growth-Share Matrix that depicts the potential for a company's products based on growth prospects and market share. Intrigued by BCG's concept and the ability to illustrate facts to improve decision making in FI's, I created the jeff for banks (jfb) pro-growth matrix.

Instead of using market share, as in the BCG model, I utilized net revenue per product. For loans, this was calculated as a percent of the product portfolio as follows: coterminous spread - provision + fee income. For deposit products the formula was: coterminous spread + fee income. This data was pulled from my firm's profitability database for all FI's that subscribe(d) to our profitability outsourcing service.

I chose to use net revenue instead of product profits because of the step-variable nature of an FI's cost structure. Most costs are fixed until a certain level where employees struggle to get the work done and the FI must invest in people and/or technology to increase capacity. If revenues decline, it is not typical for expenses to decline, as banks don't often let people go or scale down operations like a mortgage origination shop or a brokerage firm. Therefore, focusing on the products that drive the greatest revenue through a relatively fixed expense base would be closer to a realistic alternative for FIs.

I measured for both the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2010 to look at how our industry has changed. Change it has! Gone are the days that core deposit products generate net revenue between 4%-9%, as depicted by the "Stars" from 2000. That is because the re-investment rate, or credit for funds, for deposit products has dropped dramatically as a result of the interest rate environment today, particularly at the low end of the yield curve. Many readers may have experienced their treasurer lamenting they don't want any more deposits because they have no place to put them. That phenomenon is represented in the pullback of deposit products from 2000 to today.

But even in our historically low rate environment, core deposit products linger near the "Stars" box. Because revenues are low, some have drifted into the question marks. Interest rates are beyond our control, but if the net revenues per product decline, and much of the decline is outside of our control, then to move "Question Marks" to "Stars" may require an analysis of our expense base and the processes in place to support those products. Are we using technology to its fullest capacity? Do we still engage in outdated processes to protect from a risk that is negligible today?

Another interesting point from the jfb pro-growth matrix was that commercial real estate (CRE), much maligned since the recent crisis, remained in the Question Marks camp, albeit knocked down a notch because of the decline in the 3-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) used to calculate the Market Growth portion of the chart. With today's elevated loan loss provisioning, CRE continues to contribute to an FIs profitability with above average net revenue generation.

Time deposits have declined on a CAGR basis since 2007, as noted in its position on the chart. In 2000, time deposits had a CAGR of 4.65% and net revenue of 0.53%. Today, CDs CAGR is -8.69% as FIs backed away from this expensive funding source because there is no loan demand. Why book a CD when its current coterminous spread is negative, which is where it stands today? But even when CDs had a positive spread, this product remained unprofitable.

Lastly, the sheer gaggle of products in the "Question Marks" quadrant indicates an opportunity for FIs. Using analytics, product managers have the opportunity to migrate marginally profitable products into either "Stars" or "Cash Cows". Knowing where you do and don't make money is a critical starting point, and positive action based on analytics can improve your FIs financial performance.

How do you use analytics for critical decision making?

~ Jeff

Guest Post: First Quarter Economic Update by Dorothy Jaworski

The World Around Us

World events are impacting our markets. Unrest in the Middle East has already changed governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Protests and internal fighting in Libya have led to an international coalition bombing the country in order to establish a “no-fly” zone. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also face protests. Triple tragedies in Japan from the 9.0 magnitude earthquake, the giant tsunami, and the ongoing nuclear emergencies have us all unsettled.

Moody’s Rating Service never sleeps and has downgraded the debt of Spain, Greece, and yes, Japan. Oil prices keep rising and we’ve seen a 15% increase in gas prices since year end 2010. So far, about half of the positive economic impact of the surprise 2% reduction in social security taxes and small business tax cuts are gone because of higher gas prices. It may not take long before the remainder is gone, too.

It is no surprise then that the confluence of these events chipped away at the stock market rally and set into motion the inevitable correction. Stock markets had been rallying nicely since the Federal Reserve unveiled their $600 million quantitative easing program, commonly known as “QE2,” in November. Actually, stock markets are up nearly 100% since the Fed was in the midst of their first quantitative easing program in early 2009. One of the Fed’s QE2 goals, as stated by Chairman Bernanke, was to improve the stock market. In that, it has succeeded.

But the other stated goal was to keep longer term interest rates low or push them lower; this has not been accomplished. The bond markets had other ideas, selling off continuously since November, until three year through ten year Treasury yields had risen by over 100 basis points, peaking at increases of 130 to 140 basis points over November levels. It was not until stocks began to correct in early March that rates began to fall some-what, or about 25 basis points, as investors bought Treasuries and other bonds in a flight to quality because of all the uncertainty in the world.

Fundamentally, stocks should continue to do well in this, the third year of the rally. Corporate profits are strong and companies are sitting on a $2 trillion stockpile of cash. Mergers and acquisitions are continuing at a brisk pace. Prospects for economic growth are gradually improving, with 3% to 3.5% expected this year, and consumer and business confidence has been rising. The S&P 500 forward price-earnings ratio of 13.5 times is well below the historical norm of 15.5 times, so there is room to continue the upward trend, if world events cooperate, that is.

The Missing People

I usually do not obsess over economic data but I have been trying to figure out why the unemployment rate managed to drop from 9.8% to 8.9% in just three months, without a commensurate improvement in the number of jobs created. There has not been a drop of this magnitude in the unemployment rate in so short a time since 1958, when I was an infant. So, let’s look at some of the recent numbers and you will probably join me in asking “Where are the missing people?”

Payroll employment rose by 407,000 in the past three months, or an average of 135,000. Household employment, which incorporates the self-employed, rose by 664,000, or an average of 221,000.

Now, let’s look at the other data: Over the past three months, the number of people reported as unemployed has dropped by 1,028,000, the pool of available workers dropped by 1,206,000, and the total labor force dropped by 704,000. Where are these people, when there were not enough jobs created to account for the drop in unemployed persons? Why are they missing? If they didn’t get jobs, where are they?

We are creating average monthly payroll growth of 135,000 and household growth of 221,000, or barely enough to absorb new entrants into the workplace, and we are supposed to believe that the ranks of the unemployed dropped by over a million and the unemployment rate has miraculously dropped by nearly 1%! Ridiculous!

Growth for 2011

Economists were stampeding over each other to raise their GDP forecasts to 3.5% from 3.0% for 2011 earlier this year after the surprise tax cuts for consumers and businesses. Even the Federal Reserve raised their forecast range to 3.4% to 3.9% from the prior 3.0% to 3.6%. Then they all got another surprise from surging oil prices (currently over $100 per barrel) and gas prices (currently up almost 50 cents from the end of 2010), so the higher growth projections may have been a bit premature. At this point, we will probably see the originally projected 3%, given the still rising oil and gas prices, high unemployment, higher interest rates, and still weak housing markets.

To put this 3% growth rate into perspective, it would be only slightly better than 2010’s rate of 2.7% and equal to the average rate of GDP growth from 2000 to 2004. But 3% is tremendously above the recent average between 2005 and 2009 of 1.0%. We long for the glory days of the 1990s, when the average growth rate for the decade was 3.8%.

But, dream on, because the long term historical average is 3.2% since World War II, so we are close to average. I will note that GDP for 4Q10 was a record $14.86 trillion (annualized basis), which is above the prior record set in 4Q07. Consumers, businesses, and governments – state and local – are improving slowly. Very slowly. Enough to keep the Fed on hold with short term interest rates near zero – until unemployment falls from today’s high levels – from real job creation not just missing people.

Putting It All Together

Since my NCAA bracket did not turn out too well – I had Temple, Pitt, and Syracuse among others – I am forced to focus on the rest of the madness in the world. It really is true that our markets are closely tied to what is happening elsewhere and not always what is happening at home. Other than protests and natural disasters, there is one theme that has been garnering attention – that of soaring food and energy prices.

Some of the Middle East protests are in response to higher food prices, which, according to the IMF, are setting new records. So far, these dramatic price rises have not worked their way permanently into the prices of other goods and services. That is because our economic recovery is still fragile and increases in prices may not be sustainable.

Consumers likely will pull back spending in response to high prices, leading to weakening economic growth. We count on the Federal Reserve to watch inflation developments closely and they are seeing excess capacity, high unemployment, low wage and salary gains, and continued weak housing markets.

Today’s issue is to reduce unemployment; tomorrow’s issue may well be fighting inflation. Expect the Fed to keep short term rates low for an “extended period” of time, just as they promise us each month. Expect the Fed to remain angry over the bond market’s reaction to their QE2 program. For all we know, they may be plotting QE3. Stay tuned!

Thanks for reading! DJ 03/21/11

Dorothy Jaworski has worked at large and small banks for over 30 years; much of that time has been spent in investment portfolio management, risk management, and financial analysis. Dorothy has been with First Federal of Bucks County since November, 2004.