Enterprise-wide Risk Management (ERM): Yawn

I attended an industry presentation on ERM this past week put on by RSM McGladrey.  The topic highly interested me, not because it is interesting, but because everybody is talking about it and there are differing opinions about what to do about it. What an opportunity for a non-audit, non-compliance, non-IT, and non-credit blogger to write about it!

First I would like to say that the McGladrey speaker really knew his stuff and was balanced. So often I hear commentary on ERM by advocates that think it is the next best thing to, say, online banking. Well, no it isn't. It is not likely to make your FI a lick of money. That said, here is my criteria for an ERM program:

"A successful ERM will result in reduced losses that exceed the investment made in the ERM program."

~ jeff for banks

Why else would an FI embark on ERM? If the investment in ERM exceeds losses foregone, then don't invest in an ERM program. It's not worth the money. As community FIs, regulators force us to throw enough money down a black hole without us volunteering to do so.

But managing risk across organizational silos is highly fragmented in FIs. It makes sense to coordinate the effort into one area. Perhaps, as suggested by one attendee at the presentation, ERM could streamline risk management efforts to make reporting more relevant, less voluminous, and less labor intensive. If this was a by-product of ERM, then I'm in! I think your Board of Directors (Trustees for CUs) would appreciate reducing the size of monthly Board reports for monitoring risk.

An organization's risk profile looks like the bubble chart below from McGladrey's presentation. But not all risks are equal. If we were to quantify risk across the industry, Credit Risk would rank at 10 for greatest risk (on a hypothetical scale of 1 to 10), but other significant risks would be much lower such as Liquidity and Interest Rate Risk (perhaps 4's). How would a non-audit, non-compliance, non-credit person develop a ranking system for risks?

Look at past experience to determine levels of risk. For example, perform a lookback over a meaningful sample period (perhaps 10 years, or at least one economic cycle) to identify where your FI actually lost money. A second criteria could be to query your personnel with the greatest knowledge of the risk to quantify the possible loss and the likely loss from a certain risk. By developing such a discipline, the FI should determine how much resources, if any, should be dedicated to mitigating the risk.

The bubble chart above contains too much in the form of risk categories, as most categories have sub-risks. The McGladrey presenter mentioned having 20-25 risks worth monitoring and mitigating, although he was not married to it. As ERM evolves, we have to guard against monitoring so many risks that the processes that result are inefficient in their application and ineffective at preventing those risks that represent the greatest potential loss.

For example, I was evaluating processes in a client's deposit operations function where one of the ladies in the department sorted through a large stack of checks for two hours each day. I asked why she did it. She said the Bank had a check fraud about seven years ago, and therefore she had to manually review all checks over $5,000. I asked what a fraud might look like. She didn't seem clear. I asked how many she has prevented since the undertaking. She said none.

Here was an FI that allocates two employee hours per day to prevent a fraud that she probably would not prevent. The investment in resources significantly outsized the risk. I put to you that this example will be all too familiar if we implement ERM without evaluating the size and likelihood of risk. And processes, like government programs, last forever.

This past economic cycle made clear that the single greatest risk FIs face is credit risk. I don't see this changing. Even FIs that failed due to liquidity had their woes start with credit risk, including the credit risk in the FIs investment portfolio. So let's not fool ourselves into thinking that somehow "employee fraud", or some other risk, ranks nearly as high.

But there are risks that can have materially negative impacts on our business. So a CEO and Board can efficiently and effectively monitor the greatest risks to the safety and soundness of the FI, consider implementing a well thought out ERM that is focused, efficient, and effective.

Any thoughts on what such an ERM program would look like?

~ Jeff

Product Profitability Anyone? The JFB Pro-Growth Matrix

A bank attorney spoke at a recent Financial Managers' Society (FMS) meeting that I attended. His topic: Leadership. His thesis: Analytics should be the basis for strategic decision making. He offered an interesting fact: 40% of critical decisions in U.S. companies are made from the gut. This style of decision making was romanticized by Jack Welch in his popular 2001 book: Jack Straight from the Gut.

But in reading Welch's tome regarding his successful years at the helm of GE, it is clear that he was far more analytical than the book's title indicates.

Community FI's are similar to other companies in their strategic decision making. Often, critical decisions are made from the gut or based on past experience that becomes more irrelevant as industries, such as ours, rapidly transform. Such disruption gave rise to strategic advisory firms that break down strategic decisions to the facts important to increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes.

One such firm is the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), creator of the Growth-Share Matrix that depicts the potential for a company's products based on growth prospects and market share. Intrigued by BCG's concept and the ability to illustrate facts to improve decision making in FI's, I created the jeff for banks (jfb) pro-growth matrix.

Instead of using market share, as in the BCG model, I utilized net revenue per product. For loans, this was calculated as a percent of the product portfolio as follows: coterminous spread - provision + fee income. For deposit products the formula was: coterminous spread + fee income. This data was pulled from my firm's profitability database for all FI's that subscribe(d) to our profitability outsourcing service.

I chose to use net revenue instead of product profits because of the step-variable nature of an FI's cost structure. Most costs are fixed until a certain level where employees struggle to get the work done and the FI must invest in people and/or technology to increase capacity. If revenues decline, it is not typical for expenses to decline, as banks don't often let people go or scale down operations like a mortgage origination shop or a brokerage firm. Therefore, focusing on the products that drive the greatest revenue through a relatively fixed expense base would be closer to a realistic alternative for FIs.

I measured for both the fourth quarter of 2000 and 2010 to look at how our industry has changed. Change it has! Gone are the days that core deposit products generate net revenue between 4%-9%, as depicted by the "Stars" from 2000. That is because the re-investment rate, or credit for funds, for deposit products has dropped dramatically as a result of the interest rate environment today, particularly at the low end of the yield curve. Many readers may have experienced their treasurer lamenting they don't want any more deposits because they have no place to put them. That phenomenon is represented in the pullback of deposit products from 2000 to today.

But even in our historically low rate environment, core deposit products linger near the "Stars" box. Because revenues are low, some have drifted into the question marks. Interest rates are beyond our control, but if the net revenues per product decline, and much of the decline is outside of our control, then to move "Question Marks" to "Stars" may require an analysis of our expense base and the processes in place to support those products. Are we using technology to its fullest capacity? Do we still engage in outdated processes to protect from a risk that is negligible today?

Another interesting point from the jfb pro-growth matrix was that commercial real estate (CRE), much maligned since the recent crisis, remained in the Question Marks camp, albeit knocked down a notch because of the decline in the 3-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) used to calculate the Market Growth portion of the chart. With today's elevated loan loss provisioning, CRE continues to contribute to an FIs profitability with above average net revenue generation.

Time deposits have declined on a CAGR basis since 2007, as noted in its position on the chart. In 2000, time deposits had a CAGR of 4.65% and net revenue of 0.53%. Today, CDs CAGR is -8.69% as FIs backed away from this expensive funding source because there is no loan demand. Why book a CD when its current coterminous spread is negative, which is where it stands today? But even when CDs had a positive spread, this product remained unprofitable.

Lastly, the sheer gaggle of products in the "Question Marks" quadrant indicates an opportunity for FIs. Using analytics, product managers have the opportunity to migrate marginally profitable products into either "Stars" or "Cash Cows". Knowing where you do and don't make money is a critical starting point, and positive action based on analytics can improve your FIs financial performance.

How do you use analytics for critical decision making?

~ Jeff

Guest Post: First Quarter Economic Update by Dorothy Jaworski

The World Around Us

World events are impacting our markets. Unrest in the Middle East has already changed governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Protests and internal fighting in Libya have led to an international coalition bombing the country in order to establish a “no-fly” zone. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also face protests. Triple tragedies in Japan from the 9.0 magnitude earthquake, the giant tsunami, and the ongoing nuclear emergencies have us all unsettled.

Moody’s Rating Service never sleeps and has downgraded the debt of Spain, Greece, and yes, Japan. Oil prices keep rising and we’ve seen a 15% increase in gas prices since year end 2010. So far, about half of the positive economic impact of the surprise 2% reduction in social security taxes and small business tax cuts are gone because of higher gas prices. It may not take long before the remainder is gone, too.

It is no surprise then that the confluence of these events chipped away at the stock market rally and set into motion the inevitable correction. Stock markets had been rallying nicely since the Federal Reserve unveiled their $600 million quantitative easing program, commonly known as “QE2,” in November. Actually, stock markets are up nearly 100% since the Fed was in the midst of their first quantitative easing program in early 2009. One of the Fed’s QE2 goals, as stated by Chairman Bernanke, was to improve the stock market. In that, it has succeeded.

But the other stated goal was to keep longer term interest rates low or push them lower; this has not been accomplished. The bond markets had other ideas, selling off continuously since November, until three year through ten year Treasury yields had risen by over 100 basis points, peaking at increases of 130 to 140 basis points over November levels. It was not until stocks began to correct in early March that rates began to fall some-what, or about 25 basis points, as investors bought Treasuries and other bonds in a flight to quality because of all the uncertainty in the world.

Fundamentally, stocks should continue to do well in this, the third year of the rally. Corporate profits are strong and companies are sitting on a $2 trillion stockpile of cash. Mergers and acquisitions are continuing at a brisk pace. Prospects for economic growth are gradually improving, with 3% to 3.5% expected this year, and consumer and business confidence has been rising. The S&P 500 forward price-earnings ratio of 13.5 times is well below the historical norm of 15.5 times, so there is room to continue the upward trend, if world events cooperate, that is.

The Missing People

I usually do not obsess over economic data but I have been trying to figure out why the unemployment rate managed to drop from 9.8% to 8.9% in just three months, without a commensurate improvement in the number of jobs created. There has not been a drop of this magnitude in the unemployment rate in so short a time since 1958, when I was an infant. So, let’s look at some of the recent numbers and you will probably join me in asking “Where are the missing people?”

Payroll employment rose by 407,000 in the past three months, or an average of 135,000. Household employment, which incorporates the self-employed, rose by 664,000, or an average of 221,000.

Now, let’s look at the other data: Over the past three months, the number of people reported as unemployed has dropped by 1,028,000, the pool of available workers dropped by 1,206,000, and the total labor force dropped by 704,000. Where are these people, when there were not enough jobs created to account for the drop in unemployed persons? Why are they missing? If they didn’t get jobs, where are they?

We are creating average monthly payroll growth of 135,000 and household growth of 221,000, or barely enough to absorb new entrants into the workplace, and we are supposed to believe that the ranks of the unemployed dropped by over a million and the unemployment rate has miraculously dropped by nearly 1%! Ridiculous!

Growth for 2011

Economists were stampeding over each other to raise their GDP forecasts to 3.5% from 3.0% for 2011 earlier this year after the surprise tax cuts for consumers and businesses. Even the Federal Reserve raised their forecast range to 3.4% to 3.9% from the prior 3.0% to 3.6%. Then they all got another surprise from surging oil prices (currently over $100 per barrel) and gas prices (currently up almost 50 cents from the end of 2010), so the higher growth projections may have been a bit premature. At this point, we will probably see the originally projected 3%, given the still rising oil and gas prices, high unemployment, higher interest rates, and still weak housing markets.

To put this 3% growth rate into perspective, it would be only slightly better than 2010’s rate of 2.7% and equal to the average rate of GDP growth from 2000 to 2004. But 3% is tremendously above the recent average between 2005 and 2009 of 1.0%. We long for the glory days of the 1990s, when the average growth rate for the decade was 3.8%.

But, dream on, because the long term historical average is 3.2% since World War II, so we are close to average. I will note that GDP for 4Q10 was a record $14.86 trillion (annualized basis), which is above the prior record set in 4Q07. Consumers, businesses, and governments – state and local – are improving slowly. Very slowly. Enough to keep the Fed on hold with short term interest rates near zero – until unemployment falls from today’s high levels – from real job creation not just missing people.

Putting It All Together

Since my NCAA bracket did not turn out too well – I had Temple, Pitt, and Syracuse among others – I am forced to focus on the rest of the madness in the world. It really is true that our markets are closely tied to what is happening elsewhere and not always what is happening at home. Other than protests and natural disasters, there is one theme that has been garnering attention – that of soaring food and energy prices.

Some of the Middle East protests are in response to higher food prices, which, according to the IMF, are setting new records. So far, these dramatic price rises have not worked their way permanently into the prices of other goods and services. That is because our economic recovery is still fragile and increases in prices may not be sustainable.

Consumers likely will pull back spending in response to high prices, leading to weakening economic growth. We count on the Federal Reserve to watch inflation developments closely and they are seeing excess capacity, high unemployment, low wage and salary gains, and continued weak housing markets.

Today’s issue is to reduce unemployment; tomorrow’s issue may well be fighting inflation. Expect the Fed to keep short term rates low for an “extended period” of time, just as they promise us each month. Expect the Fed to remain angry over the bond market’s reaction to their QE2 program. For all we know, they may be plotting QE3. Stay tuned!

Thanks for reading! DJ 03/21/11

Dorothy Jaworski has worked at large and small banks for over 30 years; much of that time has been spent in investment portfolio management, risk management, and financial analysis. Dorothy has been with First Federal of Bucks County since November, 2004.

 

Book Report: The Lords of Strategy by Walter Kiechel III

B+ This book, written by a journalist and former editor of Fortune magazine and editorial director of Harvard Business Publishing, tracks the growth and philosophical evolution of strategy. It focuses on three strategy firms in particular: Boston Consulting Group ("BCG"), Bain & Company, and McKinsey & Company. In its entirety, I would suggest that it would be a very beneficial read for banking industry consultants, and a beneficial read for executives at community FIs.

How business is done is often, if not mostly, evolutionary. Understanding how  we moved from the days when small businesses in small towns dominated the landscape, to how merchants operated in our large pre-industrial revolution cities, the emergence of large industrial firms, the birth of the corporate man, to where we are today is important to understanding today's business climate.

Management "fads" came and went. These fads were often touted by strategy firms and their army of elite business school educated consultants. This book tracks the evolution of strategy from its early days in the 1960's at BCG to where we are today. Strategy's emergence, and its evolution, being driven by what the author terms the "fiercing of capitalism", i.e. the escalation of competition beyond a few firms and the shortening of competitive advantage driven by technology.

This created fertile ground for strategy's ascendancy and the firms that touted its virtues. Understanding the genesis of strategy and its evolution is an important step in its development and implementation at community FIs and is the basis for my recommendation for the book.

From my perspective, it was interesting to note how strategy became in vogue and how our pre-eminent strategy firms differed in their approach. Creating teams to ponder in a conference room, ruminating how strategy should be formulated and executed is foreign to relatively small consulting firms like mine. We don't develop techniques in our firm's interior. Instead, we develop it across the table from clients, while on the phone with colleagues, or at conferences listening to experts and gauging bankers' opinions.

My world is foreign to BCG's, but it was instructive for me to learn of their methods. Knowing how they do it can only help me do it better. I think it can help you too.

Here is what I liked about the book:

1. Gave detailed descriptions of how strategy came about at BCG, and how it grew and flourished not only at that august firm but also Bain and McKinsey;

2. Introduced the key players in strategy's development, not only at the above firms but also at Harvard Business School;

3. Described strategy through each stage of its evolution, and used interviews with key players in the evolution.

Here is what I didn't like:

1. Focused only on three strategy firms and Harvard Business School. Did other B-schools or consulting firms participate in a material way?

2. The author gave me several vocabulary lessons, such as when he said an author "continued to sound the tocsin" (sound the alarm). Fortunately, I read it on a Kindle and could highlight and get definitions for the difficult words. This is probably a pet peeve of mine, and I should be more thankful that I can now use "tocsin" in a sentence.

But the book is very well put together and thorough in its review of how strategy came to be. I found it a very worthwhile read and recommend it to you.

~ Jeff

Book Report note: I will occasionally read books that I believe are relevant to the banking industry. To help you determine if the book is a worthwhile read for your purposes, I will review them here. My mother said if I did not have something nice to say about someone, then don’t say it. In that vein, I will only review books that I perceive to be a “B” grade or better. Disclosure: I will typically have the reviewed book on my Amazon.com bookshelf on the right margin of this blog. If you click on any book on the shelf and buy it, I receive a small commission; typically not enough to buy a Starbucks skinny decaf latte with a sugar-free caramel shot, but perhaps enough to buy a small coffee at Wawa.

Banking: Data hungry and decision challenged?

I had lunch today with a client's regional manager. We discussed many things, but one thing he told me stuck... they used average balances to determine their highest priority customers. Many of my comrades in the community FI blogosphere feed on data, some good, some bad. But using average customer balances to determine your best customers is unfortunately very common... bad use of data.

Similar to the above, a client of ours requested that my firm identify their top 100 customers by coterminous spread. We distributed the list. They reviewed it quizzically. The senior management team did not know half of the customers on the list. Their perception of their best customers also revolved around balances.

Financial institutions have in their possession more information about their customers than any other industry, with the possible exception of medical. How do we collect it, parse it, and use it? My guess is we don't do a very good job of harnessing this information to identify top customers, profitable products, or strategic opportunities.

I teach at the ABA School of Bank Marketing Management. One of my courses is Profitability & Strategic Issues. I distribute a questionnaire to determine what information students' FIs use to make strategic decisions. The below chart identifies their response to one of the questions.

Forty three percent of respondents reported that their institution did not use marketing data for strategic planning. Another 11% reported using it sometimes. This is astounding but consistent with past years' responses. Marketing data about customers, products, and markets should be critical to strategic decisions. Yet frequently, this data remains within the confines of the Marketing Department. Trapped as bits and bytes in the FIs MCIF or similar system, only to be busted loose to help with the next product promotion.

Aside from information trapped within our core processing and ancillary systems, there is ample data available for strategic decision making in the public domain and primary research conducted by industry professionals. Are we identifying the necessary data points to make important decisions?

For example, if considering branching, one would think the key data points are as follows: Are their enough of the types of customers within a certain community that we typically target and have success with? How many competitors are in the community and what is their branch size? Are branch deposits growing or declining in the community? Are businesses growing and in what industries? Are new housing developments on the horizon and are average home prices increasing? Are branch sites available in locations with adequate traffic?

Most if not all of the data mentioned above is either publicly available or can be obtained from private sources such as local realtors and from the FIs own marketing databases. But if your experience is similar to mine, you understand many branch decisions are made based on anecdotal data or because somebody we know owns the prospective branch property.

As succeeding in financial services becomes more challenging, making informed strategic decisions will be critical to our success. The days of throwing grass into the air to determine wind direction is no longer adequate. Important information need not be out of our reach. Much can be obtained freely via public sources, or can be mined from our own systems. When making decisions with long-term impact, FIs must identify the information needed to make informed decisions and collect and analyze it. Successful execution of the strategies to lead us into a successful future depend on it.

How does your FI use data to make strategic decisions?

~ Jeff

Core Deposits Drive Value

The title of this post is common community FI phraseology. I hear it often, and use it often. My epiphany came when I performed research for a client that subscribed to the Return on Equity school of thinking. This FI had a high percentage of funding coming from CD's and FHLB borrowings, a relatively low loan to deposit ratio, and focused on generating profits within the investment portfolio.

The FI performed very well on an ROE basis. Its relatively low net interest margin, due to high funding costs and low yield on earning assets, was more than offset by very low operating costs. The FIs CEO lamented at his low trading multiples. I decided to dig into why his multiples were so low. It turned out that the best indicator for trading at high multiples was a low cost of deposits. I performed this research about ten years ago.

Dial forward to today and I decided to test again if the cost of deposits as value driver is still true. The results are in the table below. I searched for profitable banks & thrifts with at least 1,000 daily trading volume that had non-performing assets to assets less than 3%. The search yielded 101 banks and 30 thrifts. Not a large number but in order to get reasonable values I had to control for inefficient trading and asset quality.

Banks in the top quartile (best) cost of deposits traded at a 17.4% premium to bottom quartile performers in price to earnings multiples and a 35.5% premium in price to tangible book multiples.

Thrifts top quartile performers traded at an 18.9% and 30.2% premium on price to earnings and price to tangible book, respectively.

But could this be relating to their margin or yield on earning assets? I tested for yield on earning assets and the answer was no, there was no positive correlation between trading multiples and yield on earning assets.

There are imperfections to this analysis, though. Upon review, larger banks with greater trading volume also trade at higher multiples. This is probably the result of a greater pool of institutional investors due to volume requirements. Additionally, although trading multiples are beginning to show signs of improving, the overall trading of the banking sector has not returned to normal.

But ten years ago my analysis demonstrated that FIs with better deposit mixes and therefore lower cost of deposits enjoyed greater valuations. And today, the results are very similar. So why do so many FIs doggedly stick to asset-based business strategies?  Some, such as Sandy Spring Bancorp (see slide below), have been generating value from the liability side of their balance sheet and continue to do so.

According to Sandy Spring's latest investor presentation, the bank pursues a "strategic focus on small business, middle market and affluent retail customer relationships". Anecdotally, most small and mid-sized businesses do not borrow. So serving them, one would think, would require a focus on deposit relationships.

It appears as though Sandy Spring is winning, having 23% of their deposits in non-interest bearing DDAs and a cost of deposits of 0.49% in the fourth quarter. They trade at a 16.2x earnings multiple and at 130% of tangible book. It should be noted that Sandy Spring is headquartered in Maryland, a state that has experienced its fair share of credit challenges, hence the relatively low price to tangible book multiple from other top quartile banks.

Do you believe core deposits drive value? If so, why, and if not, why not?

~ Jeff

Special note: I am not making stock recommendations here. So don't call your broker to make a trade based on what I write. If you saw the performance of my stock portfolio, you would know what I mean.


Disclosure: My company has served as a strategic advisor to Sandy Spring within the past twelve months.

Experienced Bankers Wanted for Mediocre Bank

"He's not ready" is the response I often hear when I ask why a sharp banker is not part of the FIs senior leadership team. I hear it from senior leaders, industry executive recruiters, and industry consultants. But when I hear this, let me share with you what my internal voice is saying: "I want to make myself feel better by diminishing your perception of the value this clear up-and-comer can bring to our team."

If the talented individual we are speaking of is not yet good enough to serve in a similar role to me, then, ipso facto, I must be more talented than him. That is one reason I was so impressed with a southeast bank president that said to me "look around, you don't see many executives over the age of 45 because they don't get it [the new way of doing business]." This CEO must not have bought the "he/she's not ready" line.

This attitude is not exclusive to executive ranks. I recently recommended an acquaintance of mine to a regional business banking executive who agreed to take a look at his resume. The result: doesn't have business banking experience. This was true, but knowing the "type A" nature of this individual, I had little doubt he would be successful learning "credit", knocking on doors, and building relationships. Instead, this bank wanted an experienced banker. To which my internal voice said: "experienced at doing commercial real estate transactions and scoffing at directives asking him to build a full relationship."

Another version of the above is when I hear "he doesn't understand credit." I have heard this from FIs currently experiencing credit problems. Apparently it is worse to hire someone that must learn credit than to hire one that has already proven challenged in the endeavor.

Dave Martin, an industry consultant with NCBS, recently wrote in an American Banker opinion piece (see link below, may require subscription) "when we put the wrong person in a job or allow the wrong person to stay in a job, we undermine our businesses." But personnel issues are frequently cited by FI executives as to why they are not succeeding in this strategic initiative or that. And they are not willing to make the necessary changes to move their business forward. Instead, they are in search of "experienced bankers."

Arkadi Kuhlmann, founder and CEO of ING Direct USA, was quoted in a recent Harvard Business Review piece on hiring practices by Fast Company cofounder William Taylor (see link below), "if you want to renew and re-energize an industry, don't hire people from that industry. You've got to untrain them and then retrain them. I'd rather hire a jazz musician, a dancer, or a captain in the Israeli army (see link below to my post on hiring a vet). They can learn about banking. It's much harder for bankers to unlearn their bad habits." If you believe the concept of hire for attitude and train for skill is true, how do you remake your employee base?

First, the FI should clarify the strategy. Understanding where you are going is a critical yet under appreciated step in identifying the people needed to get you there. It requires vision and a roadmap to achieve the vision. Do you know where your FI is going?

Second, you must identify key positions that are important cogs in the wheel to executing strategy. I already made reference to banks that want full relationships with their business customers yet their lending team is chock full of commercial real estate transaction folks with little interest beyond their current pipeline. But if relationship building is the strategy, are your branch personnel up to it?

I have witnessed FIs build confusing and inefficient workarounds to the shortcomings in branches. One reason is that experienced branch managers tend to come from the old school, where taking care of customers once they come in the door is job 1, followed closely by ensuring the branch balances and branch cash is not off. Well, last I checked, not nearly as many customers are coming into branches anymore.

FIs pursing the "relationship" strategy fail to recognize that a relationship occurs between two people. If you hire for attitude in the branches, and get a good go-getter with a positive outlook as branch manager, but proceed to pay her minimally with little upside, she will seek promotions out of the branch. This recently happened at the branch where I bank.

Branch manager is often a destination position for those that were promoted through the teller ranks and have no need to be the bread winner. For those type A people we may want in the branches, branch manager is frequently a waypoint position until something better comes up. Not a particularly effective way to execute on a relationship strategy. But branch managers are critical to our strategy.

The manner at which we hire and fire in FIs reminds me of the different styles of George Steinbrenner and the Pittsburgh Steelers' Rooney family. Steinbrenner would make key hires relatively quickly, and would fire them if they didn't work out. The Rooneys, on the other hand, invest significant time into hiring the right people and stick by their decisions (see link below). In banking, I have witnessed us hiring like Steinbrenner, and firing like Rooney. I suspect we should choose one method or the other, and use execution of our strategy as the measurement of whether a person will work out for us.

For community FIs to remain relevant to customers and prospective customers, we must choose a strategy that delivers either a competitive advantage through differentiation or cost leadership. Fortunately, there are still opportunities to deliver cost leadership for some of us, although I would deem it to be a difficult slog to have lower costs than the very large FIs. If we want to differentiate, then how? Most strategy sessions I attend require that the community FIs people be superior in the manner at which we execute strategy. So I ask you, who is executing your strategy?

Do you believe in the "hire for attitude" philosophy or the "hire experienced bankers" one?

~ Jeff


Dave Martin's American Banker piece, "If he hollars 'bad fit', let him go."
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_42/if-he-hollers-let-him-go-1033869-1.html?zkPrintable=true

William C. Taylor's Harvard Business Review piece, "Hire for Attitude, Train for Skill"
http://blogs.hbr.org/taylor/2011/02/hire_for_attitude_train_for_sk.html

My blog post "Be all that you can be"
http://jeff-for-banks.blogspot.com/2010/05/be-all-that-you-can-be.html

New York Times piece "Rooney Method: Build Methodically and Await Rings"
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/sports/football/03rooney.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&adxnnl=1&emc=tha27&adxnnlx=1299413029-4gsue0vxqubNBTcVprKO+Q