Thursday, January 27, 2011

Will "Plain Vanilla" Kill Community Banking?

I was at a strategic planning retreat a few weeks back where a colleague lauded the concept of bankers getting back to plain vanilla community banking. I hear and read this often. Most recently Valley National Bancorp's highly respected CEO, Gerald Lipkin stated:

"The positive [fourth quarter] results are attributable to management's common sense and highly focused approach to traditional banking — gathering deposits and making relatively low-risk loans."

I will venture to say I hear and read similar comments so much that it should be considered "conventional wisdom". This line of thinking requires the person promoting it to believe that community financial institutions (FIs) somehow got away from this concept, and by doing so their profits plummeted during the financial collapse of 2008.

But if you read or watch interviews of CEOs of community FIs from 2008 forward, you will be bombarded with the message that they didn't engage in the things that led to the collapse. They mostly meant sub-prime residential mortgage lending. I would contend that this statement is true. Community FIs, in general, did not make loans to those with little wherewithal to repay them. So how did they get away from "plain vanilla" banking?

I don't think Community FIs departed from their business model at all during the crisis. Perhaps, one can argue, that because of the recession and the decline in credit quality FIs have been playing defense, and getting back to "plain vanilla" banking means beginning to play offense. But the notion that FIs got away from this model is, in my opinion, bunk. They have been using that model for decades.

Is the premise that doing "plain vanilla" banking acceptable? Valley National had an ROA in the fourth quarter of 1.08%. Pretty good by today's standards. So will continuing to operate "as is" work infinitum? I doubt it. Customer preferences are changing more rapidly than bankers are willing to change their business models, in my opinion. FIs are not like speed boats, where the driver can change course on a dime. It's more like the Titanic heading into an iceberg. You can't flip a switch on a "plain vanilla" bank model, and turn yourself into something different.

This requires bankers to look into the future to determine the course of customer preferences and where they can gain a competitive advantage. If banking changed at the pace of technology, we would be out of business. Take Apple, Inc., for example. Sometime in the mid to late 1990's, a clairvoyant leader at Apple thought that Mac sales would not drive this company forward. So they strategized. They determined where computing was going. They widened their strategic thinking to the world of multi-media and telecommunications. Where could they make a difference, be a first mover, corner a market? Below are tables indicating the significant change in revenue sources at Apple over the past eight years.

In 2010, Mac-related sales represented a paltry 20% of total sales. What if Apple stuck with "plain vanilla" desktop computing. They would probably be out of business. They made a strategic bets on iPods and music (now representing 18% of total revenue), iPhones (now representing 39% of total revenue), and the up and coming iPad (now representing 17% of total revenue).

Naysayers will point out that FIs are not tech companies, and it's a fair point. But what about Bank of New York Mellon. Below is their segment reporting from 2001 and 2010. They changed categories, but it is clear that this Bank moved away from traditional banking and determined that the best chance for success was in asset/wealth management and securities processing.

A similar argument could be made for the former Commerce Bank of Cherry Hill, New Jersey. Many scoffed at the business model of rapidly erecting high-cost/high-profile branches to pursue a targeted retail strategy. They point to Commerce's demise, having to sell to TD Bank to get out from under regulator scrutiny. But it wasn't the business model that failed, it was their executives. The business model flourished, taking market share in bucketloads from "plain vanilla" FIs.

The "plain vanilla" model still has legs. But how much longer can these FIs continue to do what they have always done? I frequently hear "customer service" touted as a point of differentiation, but fail to see how one bank's service is better than another. I also hear "relationships", but note that very large FIs build relationships too. And if a community FIs' relationships are so strong, how come customers will walk for minor rate variations?

In my opinion those that follow "plain vanilla" without making the strategic moves to remain relevant will march all the way to the cliff. Sure, those business owners are used to doing business a certain way and have predictable expectations from their FI. Those "seasoned" customers that hold a lot of the wealth and therefore the deposits also have predictable expectations. But what about the next generation business owner and depositor. Will they expect the same?

I doubt it. They all have iPhones and iPads. What will your strategic bet be?

~ Jeff

Photo of a company that stuck to a "plain vanilla" business model:
http://twitpic.com/3u05tx

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Guest Post: Fourth Quarter Economic Update by Dorothy Jaworski

Rates Give Us a Wild Ride

Bond market behavior in the fourth quarter of 2010 was one for the record books. Interest rates fell to levels that I have often described as “crazy low.” The two year Treasury yield fell to 0.33% in November, while the five year Treasury fell to 1.05% and the ten year fell to 2.49%. In most of our lifetimes, these rates were unimaginable. What was causing these levels? Was it fear that the economy will not grow? Or was it the often debated and highly feared deflation? Then, just as rates hit these lows, Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve announced another gigantic quantitative easing program, called “QE2” by the markets, where they stated they will purchase $600 billion in Treasuries through mid year 2011. The intent was to keep the crazy low rates low, or push them even lower. So what happened?

Rates spiked upward, quickly and almost in defiance of QE2. Congress entered the mix and extended the Bush tax cuts for two years and unexpectedly added new tax cuts for consumers and businesses. Near the end of December, the two year Treasury had risen to 0.73%, the five year had risen to 2.16%, and the ten year rose to 3.47%. Why did rates spike when the Fed obviously wanted them low? Was it the belief that the economy will finally grow or was it Bernanke’s comments on 60 Minutes and in the newspaper that he wanted the stock market to rise? I believe that these comments prompted the markets to sell Treasuries (and all other bonds for that matter) and buy stocks.

Mortgage rates went on the wild ride too with the 15 year rate dropping to 3.25% and the 30 year dropping to 3.875% in early November. By close to year end 2010, both rates were about 1% higher, at 4.25% and 4.875% respectively. This is not good news to the Fed, who obviously thought that low rates could help the struggling housing market.

Alas, this market seems to be slipping once again; housing prices bottomed in April, 2009 and recovered until October, 2010, before resuming a decline. The Case Shiller home price indices have lost their momentum; the year-over-year change in the 20 city index turned negative to -0.8% after nearly ten months of increases. The inventory of unsold homes stands at the equivalent of 9.5 months worth of sales, representing over 3.7 million homes. Add to this the expected foreclosures yet to come and there is a tremendous overhang of supply. No wonder the markets are under pressure.

The Economy is Recovering Slowly

The recent economic data has shown signs of improvement, with GDP growing at a 2.6% rate in the third quarter of 2010; however, this rate is not high enough to increase jobs enough to reduce the unemployment rate. Consumer confidence is still below average at 52.5 in December. And it is no wonder – unemployment is high, housing is weak, income growth is weak due to low inflation, and deleveraging/saving is still occurring. Notwithstanding the strong holiday shopping season, where sales were reported by MasterCard to have risen 5.5% over 2009, consumer spending proceeds at a slow pace.

Congress extended the Bush tax cuts at the end of 2010 for an additional two years (oh, joy, we get to go through this again in 2012) and added a consumer tax cut of two percentage points on social security tax for 2011 and a business tax break for investments in plant and equipment with accelerated deductions. Combined these tax breaks can provide up to 0.5% in GDP growth for 2011, giving us a chance to hit the 3% potential GDP level where jobs can be created in sufficient quantity to reduce the unemployment rate.

While the tax breaks will be good news for 2011, they are bad news in 2012 as GDP will likely slide by the same 0.5% when their effect is removed.

What Will You Remember Most About 2010?

2010 was an eventful year to put into the books. The Fed kept easing with QE1 early and QE2 late. The bond markets turned on the Fed at the end of the year and rates rose. A volcano named Eyjajallajokull (still no one can pronounce it) erupted and disrupted travel in Europe for weeks, a BP oil rig exploded causing a giant oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, a European debt crisis riled the markets as Greece and Ireland faltered, a “Flash Crash” in May sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average down 1,000 points, or 9%, in minutes because of “fat fingers” and sent investors out of stocks, vuvuzelas buzzed at the World Cup matches, and the Large Hadron Collider started smashing lead ions instead of protons and got closer to recreating the Big Bang on a small scale.

Locally (editor's note: Philadelphia area), we survived last winter’s Snowmegeddon, and our sports teams gave us exciting times. The Flyers gave us a great ride into the Stanley Cup Finals, Roy Halladay pitched a perfect game and a no hitter, and Cliff Lee returned home to pitch with the Fab Four. The new Miracle in the Meadowlands in December did much to grow the legends of Michael Vick and DeSean Jackson, but the Pack put an end to the excitement.

The S&P 500 rose 13% in 2010, while the Russell 2000 rose 25%. Commodities continued their bubble performance, with gold up 29% and oil up 15%. Bonds turned in a slightly positive performance for the year, despite the dramatic fourth quarter selloff in all things fixed income.

What About 2011?

I love to project, but I, like most analysts, get caught up in the moment. Rates just rose about 100 basis points for most longer duration securities while short term rates did not budge. I believe that the economy will achieve 3% GDP growth for 2011, despite the nagging issues and no help from the housing market. Unemployment may be able to fall below 9% with 3% GDP growth. Inflation will remain low – with core CPI (excluding food and energy) between 1.0% and 1.5%. As we know, food and energy prices have been rising, so overall CPI could exceed 2%.

The Federal Reserve will not raise short term interest rates during 2011; their statements basically have told us they will keep rates low for an “extended” period of time. More importantly, they will not raise rates or tighten with unemployment at such high levels. Long term rates already rose in the fourth quarter, but I expect these rates to continue to fall back and trade within a narrow range all year, provided inflation stays tame.

One risk to my forecast is that if gas prices continue up from the current $3.00 per gallon, GDP will slow, unemployment will stay high, and all bets are off.

Putting It All Together

When I wrote my last newsletter in September, I referred to the then low rates as “Eisenhower” lows, which then fell to “crazy lows.” When I wrote the following: “I do believe that the bond markets are wrong right now – that longer term rates are too low and that they will make their adjustment with the 5 year Treasury returning to 2% and 10 year Treasury returning to 3% in the next six months. However, even with these adjustments, rates are still incredibly low, and still “Eisenhower” low!” I never dreamed that that type of price action would occur so violently in just a six week span! Stay tuned!

Thanks for reading! DJ 01/08/11
 

Dorothy Jaworski has worked at large and small banks for over 30 years; much of that time has been spent in investment portfolio management, risk management, and financial analysis. Dorothy has been with First Federal of Bucks County since November, 2004.


Friday, December 31, 2010

Bank Product Pushing: Is this our strategy?

Banking has taken a beating in the media and court of public opinion in the past two years. Some of it has been unfair, particularly with how banks were associated with subprime mortgages (very few were originated by banks) and how community banks were lumped in with the practices of very large financial institutions (FIs). But if we are to be honest with ourselves, some of it is deserved and we should take positive steps to repair our image, better serve our customers, and lead us into the future.

This post is part of a three part series regarding strategies to improve our image and move us forward. The three parts include:

1. Executive compensation;
2. Fees;
3. Product pushing

In previous posts I wrote about Executive Compensation and Fees. This post will focus on Product Pushing.

In either a bank strategy session or an educational session, I can’t remember which, a speaker gave an anecdote about shopping for a mattress. A couple enters a mattress store and a salesman, most likely on commission, rapidly approaches them as they walk through the door and says “may I help you”? The couple, in unison, say “no thank you, we’re just looking”. They were just looking… in a mattress store?

Now I don’t know how much you know about mattresses. I know very little about them. But I have to believe that simply looking at a mattress would not be helpful in making an informed “buy” decision. I would need help. But I also think my reaction to an oncoming salesman would be similar to the couple’s reaction. We possess an automatic defense mechanism from being sold to.

In this context, doesn’t “just looking” in financial services seem more unlikely than the mattress analogy? But this is what customers do when they visit a bank’s website to peruse product offerings without ever contacting the bank. We avoid the human interaction because we don’t want to get sold.

Financial services, though, are very complex. Banks typically offer dozens if not over 100 traditional spread banking products. If our FI offers investment, insurance, and/or trust products, the list can grow exponentially. Why do customers not seek us out for help? Why are they “just looking”?

I think there are two reasons: 1) they do not view us as advisers, and 2) they view us more as salesman. We have perpetuated this view by emphasizing cross sales in the branch, pipelines for lenders, and gross production from our investment reps. This emphasis puts greater value on the point-of-sale, or transaction.

The result is that bankers are not perceived as acting in the customers’ best interests. Take the video below as an example of how our industry is viewed. The protagonist needs advice, probably from his parents, to help protect him from a product (in this case a credit card) pushed on him by a banker using giveaways as a promotion. This is classic product pushing, regardless of what is right for the customer.


But what if the bank took a different approach? Perhaps the parents have a great relationship with their local banker, and trust his or her advice. They consult the banker regarding their son going to college and the banker suggests a savings-account collateralized credit card that sports lower interest rates and where the parents can monitor usage.

This may not be a better transaction than giving the son a credit card knowing he is likely to run up the balance at high interest rates. But it increases the loyalty of the parents, and makes it more likely the son will bank with the same person as the parents because of this loyalty. The bank enjoys the higher balances from the parents, and ultimately wins the business of the son once he graduates and enters his earnings and borrowing years. But this philosophy won’t help the banker meet his or her quota of the product de jour.

Which situation would be better? The short-term, walkie-talkie giveaway for a high interest rate credit card would certainly be a better short-term winner for the bank. Long term is a different story. So why are banks perceived as pursuing the short-term strategy? Could it be the incentives we put in place? Could it be the capabilities of our staff responsible for relationship building? Or is it simply misfortune?

We have to ask ourselves the very strategic question of how we want to be perceived? Perception is mostly within our control and is strongly influenced by the people we hire, the manner in which we compensate them, and the strategy we pursue. I have not been in a strategy session where bankers chose to promote the product de jour, push products on customers, or resemble the mattress salesman. We should align our actions with our strategy.

~ Jeff

Sunday, December 26, 2010

Bank Strategy Tweetup: Here's how I think it would go...

I recently read a funny post by Don Cooper on how he thought the birth of Jesus would have went if Joseph was able to tweet about it (see the link below). This got me thinking how a bank strategy session would go if we conducted it via Twitter. Below is an abbreviated tweet stream of how I envisioned it going down.

@bankceo Welcome to our first ever strategy tweetup! Today we will set bank strategy in 140 characters or less.

@bankconsultant I hope this strategy tweetup thing doesn’t reduce our fee.

@banklender Every second I spend in this mind-numbing strategy tweetup I can’t be with customers, having a power lunch, or be on the links.

@bankmarketer This strategy tweetup thing is the best idea EVER!

@bankfinance REMINDER: Request an ROI on this tweetup thing from @bankmarketer

@bankconsultant Ok everyone… let’s role with this tweetup idea. What are this bank’s key strengths?

@banklender Lenders

@bankmarketer Our website

@bankceo Me

@bankfinance We have no strengths.

@bankconsultant Moving on… what are weaknesses that we must address?

@bankmarketer Branch people, because they can’t sell.

@bankceo Branch people, because we have the wrong people in the wrong seats.

@bankfinance Branch people, because our cost of funds is too high.

@banklender Branch people, because they’re not lenders.

@bankconsultant Alright, let’s talk vision. If we were to look out five years, what should the vision of this bank be? Where do we want to go?

@banklender [eyes rolling]

@bankmarketer To be the best bank we could possibly be by positioning ourselves to create value for customers… and world peace.

@bankceo To provide superior service to our customers: retail, business, not-for-profit, ethnic, non-ethnic, under-banked, over-banked, [exceeds 140 characters]

@bankfinance I never got the “vision thing”.

@bankconsultant Alright, @bankfinance insists we get specific on financial targets. Where do we see this bank’s ROA in 3 years?

@bankceo We have to be careful putting a number out there bcause we don’t want the Board to pull this doc in 3 yrs and hold us accountable.

@bankmarketer What’s an ROA?

@bankfinance 2%! [Thinks to self: Do we have to pay @bankconsultant for this?]

@banklender The ROA would be great if lending didn’t have to pull this bank like we were Budweiser Clydesdales hitched to a beer wagon.

@bankceo Thanks to all 4 joining our first strategy tweetup. It was very productive and we clearly have our marching orders for the future!

The above, of course, is a figment of my imagination. However, if you're bank actually had a strategy tweetup, please notify me and we will be happy to put your guest post on these pages!

Have a great holiday season everyone!

~ Jeff

The Birth of Jesus: As tweeted by Joseph
http://bit.ly/908Tkq

Monday, December 20, 2010

Bank Fees: Are We Out to Get-em?!

Banking has taken a beating in the media and court of public opinion in the past two years. Some of it has been unfair, particularly with how banks were associated with subprime mortgages (very few were originated by banks) and how community banks were lumped in with the practices of very large financial institutions (FIs). But if we are to be honest with ourselves, some of it is deserved and we should take positive steps to repair our image, better serve our customers, and lead us into the future.

I would like to look at three issues regarding our profession:
1. Executive Compensation;
2. Fees; and
3. Product Pushing

I focused on Executive Compensation in my last post, and would like to focus on fees here.

Fees are an absolute necessity to developing profitable products. For example, it costs a financial institution (FI) on average $388 per year in operating expenses to originate and maintain a non-interest bearing checking account (see chart).

According to my company's profitability database, FIs collect $24 in fee income per checking account per year, on average. That leaves $364 to be made up in the spread. As my banker friends know, re-investment rates are at all time lows. If an FI can re-invest checking balances at a market rate of 2.43%, as was the case in the second quarter of this year, a checking account would have to carry an average balance of $15,000, just to break even!

For the non-banker reading this post, if there are any, this may be an epiphany to you. Checking accounts are not inexpensive to maintain. Since re-investment rates that drive the spread are largely out of an FIs control, we turn to fees. This makes perfect sense.

But fees are under attack, as the link to a recent Wall Street Journal article indicates. It is part of conventional wisdom that all fees charged by FIs are bad, and forced on the public by insidious bankers. How did this perception come about?

Probably as a result of the logic presented above. In order to make deposit products profitable, fee income is an important part of the revenue stream. But this drive to increase fees came at the expense of reputation risk. I'm talking about the decisions bankers may have made with little discussion about how the application of this fee or that will be perceived by the FIs customers and the public at large.

An example of fee income gone wild is the order of check presentment to maximize overdrafts. You know what I'm talking about... ordering the checks received during a business day so that the large ones are presented first, causing an overdraft, and the subsequent checks are all overdrawn as well. If we presented them in a different order, the FI may have honored most of the checks. This may have sounded like a good idea when the vendor presented it to us, but the accumulation of decisions like this has led the public to draw its conclusions that we are "out to get them". We must consider this possibility in future decision making.

Recent legislation and regulation has put pressure on fees. The opt-in requirement that has the potential to reduce overall deposit fees has not resulted in wide-scale deposit fee declines (see chart). But the Durbin Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act was worrisome, and now that the Fed has proposed reducing interchange fees from an average of $0.44 per debit transaction to $0.12, we will seek new revenue sources and expense reductions to offset the loss.


But while looking, we must ask ourselves the following questions:
1. Are we providing value that the customer should be willing to pay us for?
2. Is this fair to both our FI and the customer? and
3. Are we delivering the product and service as efficiently as possible?

I think if the answer is yes to all three, then customers should be willing to incur changes to their deposit products that allows their FI to profit fairly from their business.

If we answer no to any one of the three, then we will be encouraged to try old tricks... charge fees with as little transparency as absolutely required, and run the reputation risk we have so willingly accepted up to this point.

~ Jeff

WSJ Article: Why Checking Fees Keep Going Up
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703865004575648603199758586.html

Friday, November 26, 2010

Compensation Conundrum: Do banks pay CEOs too much?

Banking has taken a beating in the media and court of public opinion in the past two years. Some of it has been unfair, particularly with how banks were associated with subprime mortgages (very few were originated by banks) and how community banks were lumped in with the practices of very large financial institutions (FIs). But if we are to be honest with ourselves, some of it is deserved and we should take positive steps to repair our image, better serve our customers, and lead us into the future.

I would like to look at three issues regarding our profession, and focus on Executive Compensation in this post:

1. Executive Compensation;
2. Fees; and
3. Product Pushing

Executive Compensation

My commentary may be the equivalent of digesting castor oil for some readers and it may not earn me fans in the executive suites of the very large FIs. But I do not think the value some executives deliver is commensurate with their compensation.

An egregious example is Charles Prince, former CEO of Citigroup. He took control of the behemoth bank when the stock traded in the $50’s, left amid huge losses in subprime mortgages when the stock price fell into the $30’s, and it is now trading at around $4. He didn’t receive severance, but he somehow received compensation and benefits of around $29 million at departure (see link). Was he worth it? I think I could have delivered that performance for much less.

In an era where community banks differentiate themselves on service and relationships, it is mysterious why we pay executives so much more than those responsible for delivering the service and building the relationships. I understand in a community bank environment executives serve this function also, but community FIs should examine their compensation strategies and the makeup of their employee base to determine if both are consistent with executing a relationship driven strategy. Paying the senior executive several multiples more than those that determine the success or failure of your strategy may not be a very good practice. See table below.


The CEO compensation in the table is highly skewed towards smaller banks, as my experience has been that they typically make more. However, I don’t want to suggest that CEO’s or other executives make less. On the contrary, I am suggesting that those most responsible for executing on your strategy are compensated more.

I understand the most extreme examples reside in mega-banks, but the video below represents how our entire industry may be viewed.


 
How can a community FI achieve a state where successful customer relationship staff are compensated more? The FI should look within itself. What percent of staff are dedicated to serving existing customers and winning new ones versus staff that is behind the scenes? In my experience, community FIs over-invest in outdated processes that should have long ago been replaced with technology. Having less support personnel frees up greater resources to elevate the quality of relationship management staff, improve retention of such employees, and differentiate you from the mega-bank.

What are your thoughts on your FIs compensation strategy?

I will discuss Fees and Product Pushing in future posts.

~ Jeff

Link to Charles Prince story

Link to BLS stats
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_52.htm

Sunday, November 14, 2010

The Tale of Two Banks, One Town

This blog post idea occurred to me several months ago but I have been hesitant to commit to print. My first inclination was to describe the main characters of the drama without actually naming them. This stems from the age-old maxim, "if you don't have something nice to say...". But the third quarter improvement to profitability by both banks represents a return to the way it has been over the past decade... the smaller bank outperforms the larger one. I'm talking about First Commonwealth Financial Corporation ("FCF") and S&T Bancorp ("S&T") of Indiana, Pennsylvania.

Most readers have no idea where on a map you can find Indiana, Pennsylvania. It's very name says "opposite", two states in one name. But if you bother to look at a map of the state, you will find Indiana in the James Carville description of Pennsylvania: "you have Philadelphia and Pittsburgh and Alabama in between". Indiana is in the Alabama in between. Think Punxsutawney Phil. Not exactly a budding metropolis; and yet it has two multi-billion dollar banks headquartered there.

Both banks have been experiencing loan problems. The problems stemmed from that unquenchable desire to get bigger. Indiana and its surrounding communities lack the growth that can support such ambitions. So both institutions determined in the conference rooms in the executive suite to expand lending beyond their geography. Those decisions amplified their credit problems in a challenging environment. At September 30th, FCF's non-performing assets as a percent of assets (NPAs/Assets) were 2.70% and S&T's were 2.05%. Not disastrous, but not that good, either. Lending outside of your expertise, either by industry, types of loans, or geography, oftentimes ends in bad results.

But in the midst of their challenges, S&T continues to outperform FCF. Year-to-date, S&T had an ROA of 1.07% and FCF had 0.24%. This was not an anomaly. S&T has had a superior ROA in every year that I reviewed (2001-2009). This flies in the face of the economies of scale crowd, that are running around to bank executives yammering for them to get larger or get out. As the chart below demonstrates, FCF has been larger than S&T.

Some will object to my use of ROA as a proxy for profitability. But lets dispense of a debate on proper ratio analysis, and strip down financial performance to its rawest form, net income. Although FCF has always been larger, S&T has always delivered superior net income to their shareholders (see chart below). How could such a larger financial institution be outdone by its smaller competitor across the street?

One reason is net interest margin. In all periods that I analyzed, S&T had a superior margin. Year to date, S&T's margin was 4.04% versus 3.88% for FCF. This flies in the face of the asset quality stats noted above. If S&T has a lower amount of non-performing assets, then it should have a smaller margin because it presumably lends more conservatively. Better credits would seem to demand lower loan coupons, one would logically think.

Another reason S&T consistently outperforms FCF is efficiency ratio (net interest income plus non interest income divided by non interest expense). Year to date S&T efficiency ratio was 52.11% versus FCF's at 61.29%. Similar to the other ratios, S&T was superior in every period analyzed. I understand efficiency ratio is impacted by the superior margin, but there is more to it than that. S&T simply operates more efficiently, spending their operating expenses prudently. This works against the economies of scale gang because S&T is over 30% smaller than FCF in total assets.

Both institutions engaged in M&A over the past ten years. S&T acquired two financial institutions totalling $1.1 billion in total assets for $261 million, equating to a purchase price of 24% of assets acquired. FCF acquired three financial institutions totalling $1.6 billion in total assets for $274 million, or 16% of assets acquired. Although I feel it safe to say that S&T was less acquisitive, I do not think "to buy or not to buy" is why there is such a disparity in financial performance.

If not size, if not M&A, if not geography, then why does one consistently outperform the other? I do not think the obvious needs to be said, unless it is in the boardroom of First Commonwealth Financial.

~ Jeff

Special note: I am not making stock recommendations here. So don't call your broker to make a trade based on what I write. If you saw the performance of my stock portfolio, you would know what I mean.