Showing posts with label capital plan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label capital plan. Show all posts

Friday, February 21, 2025

Bottom-Up Capital Calculations

Ten years ago I wrote What's Your Well-Capitalized on these pages. It was in response to regulators persistently asking bankers the same question. Today, we have not done much about it because we have relied on that lazy space using the regulatory definition of well capitalized. Or at least regulatory expectation of it.

I recently spoke at the American Bankers' Association Conference for Community Bankers regarding risk appetite statements in a presentation called Leave Nothing Unspoken. Drop me your e-mail if you would like me to send the presentation. One slide, however, dealt with this very issue of "what's your well-capitalized." Because developing your risk guardrails for executing strategy, which is what a risk appetite statement should be, is far less effective if you don't build the culture and accountabilities throughout the organization to be consistent with your risk appetite.

Exhibit number 1 is a bank whose main incentive for lenders is volume. This creates the incentive to do deals based on size, regardless of structure, duration or rate. What does it matter if the lender does a thinly priced $4 million, 7-year commercial real estate deal with a 25-year amortization and lite covenants or a fairly priced, 5-year deal with standard covenants? If their goal is $20 million of annual production, they are 20% there regardless. Right? 

In comes risk adjusted return on capital, or RAROC. Most loan pricing tools use an ROE hurdle rate to determine what the rate should be. Aside from proper use of these tools and any manipulating that might go on to get deals done, the goal is a good one. Assign capital to a pending loan deal based on risk to the institution. Like the slide I showed to attendees at the ABA conference.


These capital allocation tables should be done in advance, be simple and understandable, and be transparent to all that use them. I imagine a small risk committee that develops these lookup tables and assigns capital to every balance sheet item. And for many categories, such as loans and investment securities, which carry the most risk to a financial institution, have necessary granularity so a 5-rated, 5-year and 20-year amortizing commercial real estate loan gets a lower capital allocation than a 6-rated, 7-year deal. Now the lender has to seek a better yield to get the same RAROC. And perhaps the ROE for the riskier deal is also higher. Further aligning risk versus reward.

Other major asset categories such as "Cash & Due", "buildings", and "BOLI" can be assigned capital at the balance sheet level, such as "buildings" receive a capital buffer of 1%. Naysayers might argue that a building is a 100% risk-weighted, and therefore needs to carry 10% capital (5% well capitalized under the Leverage Ratio, plus a 5% buffer). But that assumes, as prompt corrective action capital requirements must assume, that liabilities do not have risk.

Ask former Silicon Valley Bank executives if that is true.

For sure there is no 5% Leverage Ratio requirement for liabilities, but buffers should also be assigned to them based on the bank's perceived risk of those liabilities. Deposits and borrowings (i.e. the bank's funding) should create greater granularity based on product and product characteristics and the attendant risk of the instrument, much like loans and investments. 

Some may say that the above model is overly simplistic. I'm a simple man. And there is beauty in simplicity. No matter how complex a model you make, it will be some form of wrong as it stands the test of time. Being simply off is far better than building a highly complex black box to be as off, or even a little less off, than a simple one. Because users of the information will be less motivated to adhere to it if they don't understand how it was made.

This, in my opinion, should be done to identify what is your well capitalized. Because you have evaluated risk by balance sheet category and assigned capital based on risk. You can then determine if you have enough capital to support your current balance sheet and your strategically projected balance sheet. You know what buffer you have to withstand stress events.

If your strategic plan calls for a 15% ROE, now you can create a threshold by loan type for lenders to pursue and fairly price to be consistent with your strategy goal and risk appetite. Plus you would create the cultural discipline to manage risk from your first line of defense, the front line.


As I told attendees to my presentation, all banks should do this.


Do you?


~ Jeff




Saturday, July 28, 2018

For Financial Institutions, Is There Such A Thing As Too Much Capital? Yes. Yes There Is.

I was on a panel at a bankers conference with an investment banker and two bank fund investors. One of the investors' opening remarks was about banks that were over-capitalized. I panned the audience to see if regulators were present.

But there were enough open jaw gapes to see that many bankers share the regulatory belief that there is no such thing as too much capital. And that may be true for financial institutions that don't take investor money. But if your bank is shareholder owned, then you may be hoarding their money. And as a bank shareholder myself, I like to make my own hoarding decisions.

I have written on these pages about a method to estimate your "well capitalized", a question your regulators may have asked you. Having done this, and seeing that your strategic plan has you comfortably above your well capitalized and trending higher, what do you do with the excess capital?

Derek McGee of Austin law firm Fenimore, Kay, Harrison, and Ford had four to-the-point ideas in a recent Bank Director Magazine article. I would like to lay out his four ideas with my take on them.


1. Dividends. "Returning excess capital to shareholders through enhanced dividend payouts increases the current income stream provided to shareholders and is often a well-received option. However, in evaluating the appropriate level of dividends, including whether to commence paying or increase dividends, banks should be aware of two potential issues. First, an increase in dividends is often difficult to reverse, as shareholders generally begin to plan for the income stream associated with the enhanced dividend payout. Second, the payment of dividends does not provide liquidity to those shareholders looking for an exit. Accordingly, dividends, while representing an efficient option for deploying excess capital, presents other considerations that should be evaluated in the context of a bank's strategic planning." 

My take: Amen Derek! In a blog post this year, Bank Dividends: Go Ahead and Drink the Kool Aid, I called for the same thing. And to use special dividends and deliberate shareholder communications to help overcome shareholder expectations mentioned above. I have not experienced a bank that made the pivot from being a growth company to a cash cow, where profits are maximized and dividends are plentiful. It is a natural evolution of a company built to endure. 


2. Stock Repurchases. "Stock repurchases, whether through a tender offer, stock repurchase plan or other discretionary stock repurchase, enhance liquidity of investment for selling shareholders, while creating value for non-selling shareholders by increasing their stake in the bank. Following a stock repurchase, bank earnings are spread over a smaller shareholder base, which increases earnings per share and the value of each share. Stock purchases can be a highly effective use of excess capital, particularly where the bank believes its stock is undervalued. Because repurchases can be conducted through a number of vehicles, a bank may balance its desire to effectively deploy a targeted amount of excess capital against its need to maintain operational flexibility."

My take: Institutional shareholders own greater than two thirds of publicly traded financial institutions' shares outstanding. And share buybacks are a favorite of theirs. The challenge is that they would like to liquidate their ownership when the value is at its peak. Meaning the financial institution purchasing its shares would likely enjoy minimal earnings accretion and create book value dilution. But, as Derek pointed out, it is a highly effective use of excess capital when the bank believes it is undervalued. One bank stock analyst thinks every bank should calculate the earnings accretion of a prospective merger versus the earnings accretion of a share buyback. If the buyback is more accretive, why do a riskier merger?


3. De Novo Expansion in Vibrant Markets. "Banks can also reinvest excess capital through organic expansion into new markets through de novo branching and the acquisition of key deposit or loan officers."

My take: When a race car enters the pits, it is losing time. If not to recalibrate, refuel, and re-tire, drivers wouldn't do it. If you compare bank strategy to a 500-mile race, banks would also enter the pits. But if you compare bank strategy to a few times around the track, you would be foolish to do so. Think of the short race as budgets, and the 500-miler as strategy. You have to be willing to accept the short-term setback of entering the pits (i.e. making strategic investments like Derek mentioned) to position you to win the race. 


4. Mergers & Acquisitions. "Banks can deploy excess capital to jumpstart growth through merger and acquisition opportunities. In general, size and scale boost profitability metrics and enhance earnings growth, and mergers and acquisitions can be an efficient mechanism to generate size and scale. Any successful acquisition must be complementary from a strategic standpoint, as well as from a culture perspective."

My take: Derek's "complementary" comment was right on. Listen to my firm's most recent podcast on M&A cultural integration featuring an interview with Jim Vaccaro, Chairman and CEO of Manasquan Bank, that is in the process of merger integration as I type. In addition to a cultural fit, the geography and balance sheets should be complementary, and the earnings accretion should exceed what the buying institution could achieve on its own. Tangible book value dilution, which tends to get a lot of play in the investment media, should not be to the level to cause long-term downward pressure on the buyer's stock price. 

Out of the four, M&A is the least within the control of the financial institution, as this takes a willing partner.


What other uses of excess capital do you propose? 


~ Jeff



Thursday, July 14, 2016

Is That a Risky Bank Customer?

Customer risk assessments are a fact of life in banking. Banks must determine how a new customer will affect its overall risk profile. Most, in my experience, do it in the form of a Q&A form, to be filed with the rest of the customer paperwork. What I see as papering the file.

But let's think about how it could and should be.

It is prudent to determine the risk profile of a customer and how it will impact your bank. Taken alone, it is highly unlikely one customer will impact the bank in a significant way. But grouped together, customers with similar profiles that act similarly within the economy can elevate risk. Think loan concentrations. As a matter of course we measure loan concentrations by loan type, such as construction or non-owner occupied real estate.

And there are red-flag industries that elevate risk, such as check cashing or marijuana businesses.

I have written about banks determining their own well-capitalized by allocating capital to different balance sheet categories based on the bank's perceived risk of those categories. It is a top down approach. But what if this analysis starts at the most granular level... every customer? And the bank uses its customer risk assessment process to determine the amount of capital allocated to that customer?

If built appropriately, it could be a desktop app the lender, branch, or call center employee could complete in front of the customer. See a sample of what I am talking about in the accompanying table.


Multiply this times every customer and every account and you would be able to calculate the capital required to support your balance sheet from the bottom up.

You can integrate ROE hurdles to feed pricing models in order to meet or exceed the hurdle. You can calculate customer profitability in terms of ROE, and create actionable customer tiers, giving platinum service to top tier, active cross-sell to middle tier, and efficient service to lower tier. And when regulators review your customer risk assessment process, and see that it is integrated into your pricing and profit models, capital plan, and strategic plan, trumpets will sound.

Sure, there will be challenges. I'm no compliance or risk expert so I'm not sure what other risk information should be collected on the customer. And what if Joe's year over year profit picture changes, or reality determines that Joe is bringing in bags of cash twice per week. A well designed system could send ticklers to the relationship officer to revisit the customer risk assessment based on the new information.

A disciplined, yet simple design that is integrated into your systems and processes could yield more accurate capital needs based on the sum total risk by each of the bank's customers. 

Do you think this is how it should be?

~ Jeff

Saturday, January 24, 2015

Bankers: What's Your "Well Capitalized"?

Prediction: The Federal Reserve's Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and its complementary Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (DFAST) will meet its intended purpose, to better ensure financial institutions have sufficient capital during times of economic duress.

But not why you think.

If you look at Citigroup's or BofA's leverage ratio today versus 2006 or 2007, it is clear that they carry far more capital than before the financial crisis. And that, my readers, was the intended purpose. 

But it is not because CCAR or DFAST are properly assessing risk. The models are too complex and theoretical. An investment banker from a very large financial institution told me his bank submitted an 11,000 page CCAR to the Fed and they turned it down. Another prediction: nobody read an 11,000 page document. Nobody. And nobody understood it. That doesn't mean somebody didn't understand page 5,387, but the entire document? C'mon.

As long as the answer was, carry more capital, complex banks will be better prepared to weather economic storms. Perhaps regulators would save banks time, resources, and money if they took the age-old parent response to why banks should carry more capital... Because I said so!

As feared, DFAST schemes are being pushed down to smaller organizations. Regulators are asking for capital plans, and an assessment of risk in the bank's strategy to determine capital needs. In other words, what's your well capitalized? My firm wrote a newsletter on the issue. But I want to break it down to an even simpler form. 

Call it the Marsico Method. Because I'm a narcissist and want something named after me.

The below table shows the Marsico Method in its simplest form.


Currently, a bank is required to have a Leverage Ratio of 5% to be considered "well capitalized" by US regulators. So the Marsico Method begins with 5% applied to each asset category. No application of the 5% to liabilities, since capital ratios are calculated off of assets. That doesn't mean that liabilities don't carry risk, as you will see with the Risk Buffer.

The Risk Buffer column is similar to the buffer concept applied by Basel III, except that scheme applies a straight up 2.5% buffer to a common equity tier 1 (CET1) minimum of 4.5%, for a total CET1 ratio of 7%, to be fully phased in by 2018.

But in the Marsico Method, the Risk Buffer is an assessment of the potential loss estimate of each balance sheet item, based on a rational analysis by the financial institution. The table above is a high level balance sheet. Hypothetical? Not really. It is Cape Cod Five Cent Savings Bank's balance sheet. And according to the analysis, their well capitalized is 7.90%. Meaning that if they experienced stress and began taking losses, the 2.9% buffer above the 5% should be sufficient to staunch the bleeding.

There would be more detail provided by specific loan, deposit, and other balance sheet categories to come up with the overall Risk Buffer per category. For example, upon analysis of the performance of the home equity line of credit portfolio during past downturns and rapid interest rate changes, the bank determines that the loss potential is 1.85%... hence the Risk Buffer for that particular balance sheet category.

Banks should not limit themselves to on balance sheet items. There is risk in pass through residential mortgage lending, loan commitments, and fee-based businesses to account for. And there is risk on the liability side of the balance sheet such as interest rate and liquidity risk, fraud, etc. That is why there is a Risk Buffer applied to those categories as well, although the risk is typically less than the asset side.

Using the Marsico Method, banks can then project the impact to the balance sheet and therefore Required Equity based on their strategy. This would flow nicely into their Capital Plan that identifies actions to augment capital should the bank experience a stress scenario. 

It also provides a nice answer to your regulators, Board of Directors, and other constituencies when they ask, what's your "well capitalized"?

I'd love to hear your thoughts on this approach!

~ Jeff



Friday, July 20, 2012

Capital and More of It!

The regulatory definition of "well capitalized" has not changed post financial crisis.

Tier 1 leverage ratio: 5%
Tier 1 risk-based ratio: 6%
Total risk-based ratio: 10%

So where is all of this belly aching about capital requirements coming from? It has come from three places, in my opinion.

1. IMCRs

When the financial crisis struck, and FIs began to falter, regulators were issuing regulatory orders (supervisory agreements, written agreements, cease & desist orders, and memorandum of understandings, collectively "ROs") faster than my daughters point out that I'm wrong. If you are not familiar with my family, it happens a lot.

A typical article in an RO requires an FI to increase its capital based on perceived risk. The only relevant perceiver, in this case, is the regulator. The FDIC IMCR commonly required a Tier 1 leverage ratio of 8%, and total risk-based ratio of 12%. The OCC, not to be trumped by their arch nemesis, opted for 9% and 13% respectively.

But this technique to raise the capital bar only applied to FIs under ROs. So the next shoe to drop was...

2. Capital Plans

Regulators began requiring formal capital plans during routine exam cycles. I knew this trend was going to stay when a bank with a 16% leverage ratio called me for help developing their capital plan. My response: you need a plan to say what you are going to do with it all? But I digress.

In 2009 as a result of the crisis, the Fed performed a Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) on our 19 largest bank holding companies to see if they required more capital under adverse conditions. What adverse conditions do you say? Look at the table below that shows loss rate assumptions applied to specific loan portfolios.


In other words, the banks had to assume they would lose 25% of their home equity loans in a stress scenario. The Fed never intended to apply these loss rates to traditional community FIs. But regulators are increasingly tightening the noose on FIs for applying more aggressive loss rates to their stress scenarios in developing capital plans. In addition, they are requiring Boards, based on the results of the stress scenarios, to set their own minimum capital ratios.

This was step 2 of the increasing capital requirements without actually increasing the capital requirements. And the next step...

3. Basel III

And now the trifecta of capital pressures, Basel III. Deferring to international regulators, US regulators get their way. Adopt Basel III, and suddenly that Tier 1 leverage ratio goes from 5% to 7%, and qualifying Tier 1 capital is re-defined. Total risk-based capital goes from 10% to 10.5%. Not bad you might think. But the risk weightings of certain asset classes change, and will be more difficult to track.

Basel III puts pressure on the numerator (what qualifies as Tier 1 capital) and the denominator (risk weights of certain asset classes).  If Basel is adopted according to its timetable, FIs will have to be in full compliance by the end of 2018. Better get your popcorn.

The solutions: Greater earnings, lower dividends, greater amounts of common equity... and lower returns on equity.

Is your FI making changes to increase capital?

~ Jeff