Showing posts with label bank efficiency ratio. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank efficiency ratio. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 21, 2020

Two Ideas to Lower Operating Cost Per Account

Last week I wrote a TKG Perspective's article on Bank Profitability in 2019. I congratulated community financial institutions for delivering a positive trend in business checking account operating cost per account. The challenge is, aside from residential mortgages, all other product categories showed negative trends in operating cost per account.

In the below video blog, I offer two ideas to drive down long-term cost per account in other categories. 

Click HERE to view the TKG Perspectives article. 

Click HERE to view the cited blog post on re-thinking branch staffing.



~ Jeff



Friday, January 20, 2017

Banking Economies of Scale Revisited

In 2011, on these pages, I wrote my most read blog post ever, titled: Does your bank achieve positive operating leverage? Even today, nearly six years later, it receives a material amount of views. Particularly from larger financial institutions.

Economies of scale has eluded our industry in its purist form. For some time, banks between $1B and $10B in total assets tend to wring out the best expense ratios (operating expense/average assets) and efficiency ratios. So economies of scale hucksters walk with this chink in their armor as to why their story-line falters at a certain size.

I also noted in my most recent and in all of my past Top 5 total return posts that community banks deliver superior returns to their larger brethren. So, although there are plenty of consultants and investment bankers with pitch books telling you to get bigger, there are also contrarians such as myself that believe that bigger is not always better. And my pitch book is simply a bunch of spreadsheets. No fancy bubble charts, green light/red light tables, or tombstones. 

In this post I would like to revisit a couple of tables. First, I broke down all commercial banks by asset size to show expense and efficiency ratios as banks became larger. The results are below.



As the table suggests, financial institutions of all sizes reduced their relative operating expenses since 2011, with the only blip being a slight expense ratio increase in the $500MM-$1B commercial bank category. I should note that the efficiency ratio from that sized bank actually went down between 2011-16, suggesting a slightly better net interest margin.

The economies of scale argument clearly has merit, as you can see from the table. As asset sizes increase, expense and efficiency ratios tend to decrease. With that pesky exception of financial institutions between $5B-$10B in assets. These are averages. So there are exceptions. And I have often spoken about there being a significant number of exceptions to the economies of scale bromide. 

One example is German American Bank, highlighted in American Banker's Community Banker of the Year issue, and on this blog. It is a $3B bank with a 55% efficiency ratio. Open Bank in Los Angeles is a $722 million bank with a 58% efficiency ratio. I didn't have to research small efficient banks. They rolled off my tongue. Actually, my fingertips.

The below table was taken from my firm's profitability outsourcing database. We do the cost accounting for dozens of financial institutions that includes calculating operating cost per product account. Did costs go down at this granular level as assets grew?



Obviously, no. But why? If assets grew, and the bankwide expense and efficiency ratio has generally declined as banks grew, how did these costs go up? It is a fully absorbed cost system, so all costs within the bank are allocated to products and services.

My theory is this. Average balances per account have been growing since the low end of the yield curve has hovered near zero, and today is below 1%. The cost to originate and maintain a $100,000 money market account is nearly identical to originating and maintaining a $50,000 money market account. The growing average balance per account phenomenon has been occurring in most bank products. So, bankwide, costs would appear to go down because denominators, average assets in the expense ratio and total revenue in the efficiency ratio, are going up with the average balance per account.

Number of accounts, however, have not been increasing at nearly the same pace as the balance sheet, if at all. So all of those resources at your financial institution designed to grow new account relationships have not been efficiently utilized. 

In other words, in account originations, financial institutions are generally, and on average, over capacity. 

Financial institutions have tried to reduce this capacity in branches by consolidation and staff reduction. That is why you don't see material increases in cost per account in deposit categories. 

But either through expense reduction or new account acquisition, there is more left to do.


Monday, July 21, 2014

Will Bigger Lead to a More Efficient Bank?

A friendly competitor of ours, Anita Newcomb, spoke about strategic planning and economies of scale in banking at the recent Maryland Bankers Association annual convention. She led attendees through the increasing regulatory burden and the need for some level of scale to remain competitive.

This got me thinking, if Anita's premise is correct, that bigger is necessary to compete, then what is bigger? And what has changed since before the dawn of Dodd-Frank? So I went to the numbers. As I have often said, it always comes down to a spreadsheet.

I searched for all banks and thrifts that have existed since at least 2007. Any institution that had "NA" in their efficiency ratio for either 2007 or year to date (YTD) 2014 I eliminated. So the sample size was fairly large, nearly all financial institutions in existence today. I then parsed them into seven asset size categories, and compared their efficiency ratios in 2007 and today. The result is the below tables.



For both periods, the lowest efficiency ratios come from the $20B - $100B asset class. In 2007, this asset class had 60% of their members achieve an efficiency ratio lower than 55%. That number has shrunk from 60% to 30% YTD, a dramatic fall from glory. Yet the asset class retains the honor of the highest percent of banks that achieve the under 55% honor.

All asset classes suffered declines in the percent that have efficiency ratios lower than 55%. In 2007, however, you can see the steep dropoff in efficiency between the $500MM - $1B and the $1B - $5B classes. In 2014, the dropoff moved upstream to the larger banks, with 24% of the $5B - $10B banks achieving < 55%, and the $1B - $5B asset class only having 15% under 55%.

So, at least statistically, it appears as though it is becoming more difficult for banks with less than $5B in assets to achieve superior efficiency.  But it is difficult for everybody, not just the under $5B class.

One of my working theories regarding the "you must be bigger" argument was that the number of smaller institutions that achieve superior efficiency is shrinking. So the anecdotes about how this small bank or that small bank do it (achieve superior efficiency) are declining. But the anecdotes about all banks achieving superior efficiency are also in decline, according to the statistics.

Even though only 11% of banks with less than $500MM in assets achieve a sub 55% efficiency ratio, it still represents the greatest amount of banks that achieve the feat. So, if you are sitting around your Board table or in senior management meetings lamenting about rising costs relating to regulation and technology, perhaps instead of calling your investment banker, you should ask how the 11% of small financial institutions do it.

It's a legitimate question, right?

~ Jeff

Thursday, August 04, 2011

Back of the Envelope: Branch Acquisition Math Made Easy

On Sunday, July 31st, First Niagara Financial Group Inc. ($30.89 billion) agreed to buy 195 Northeast branches with approximately $15 billion in deposits from HSBC Holdings Plc for an approximate 6.67% deposit premium. During a conference call the next day, First Niagara President and CEO John Koelmel said the bank will divest 100 of the branches and will likely sell about two-thirds of the divested branches and close the others.

Aside from making the announcement on a Sunday, it is odd to strike a deal only to have to divest over half of the bounty. But the branch divestiture has some upstate New York financial institutions circling branches like hyenas around a wildebeest.

Branch purchases are on the mind of many CEOs these days as a means to accelerate growth to achieve the perceived scale necessary to absorb increasing, non value added costs such as compliance and systems security. Nobody knows how big they have to be, just bigger. Sort of like professional baseball players in the late 90's.

But it is not important enough to just be big. As noted in a prior post regarding how FIs failed to reduce expense and efficiency ratios as they grew (see link below), it is more important to be smart than big. Take this from one who invested some of my daughter's college money in Sovereign Bank, a bank that prayed at the altar of bigger is better, only to have me work harder to fund the money I lost. The lakehouse will have to wait.

Analyzing the impact of a branch purchase is not particularly complicated. I ran a hypothetical analysis on the back of an envelope for Schmidlap National Bank buying a $50 million in deposits branch from First Niagara (see photo).

Counter-intuitive for those not initiated in branch purchase is that the buyer actually receives funds.  For example, if Schmidlap buys $50 million in deposits for a $1 million premium and the value of the fixed assets of the branch (including real estate, tables, desks, everything except the signs) was $2 million, Schmidlap would get a check for $47 million at closing from First Niagara.

Except if you listen to some of my early adopter bank marketing or IT friends, First Niagara would more likely remit payment via a QR code on their smart phone.

Schmidlap would have to pay the interest expense on all $50 million of deposits. They would also have to amortize the premium paid over some period. In this hypothetical case, it amortizes straight line over 10 years. There are limited exceptions to having to amortize the entire premium. And First Niagara may very well be able to put some of their premium paid in goodwill. But when acquiring only one branch, such as what Schmidlap is doing, it is likely the whole premium will be amortized. This is a non-cash charge, but an expense nonetheless.

Since Schmidlap only receives $47 million in net proceeds, that is what they have to invest in either loans or the investment portfolio. Yields on bank qualified investments are so low these days, that for any branch purchase to be anything more than a single at best, the buyer would hope to deploy proceeds in loans. In Schmidlap's case, we assume that they can put the net proceeds to work at 3% and the deposits cost 1%.

When all is said and done, this branch purchase will only drop $385,000 to pre-tax profit. Readers may think that $385k is better than nothing. But this represents only 0.77% pre-tax return on assets. If Schmidlap has a better ratio at time of closing, than this transaction would bring their pre-tax ROA down.  If the bank allocated $4 million of capital (an 8% leverage ratio) to support the branch, that would yield a 9.63% pre-tax return on equity.

Not exactly a home run, would you agree? But Schmidlap would be bigger, just not better. Or am I looking at it wrong? Doesn't bigger equate to better? Barry Bonds thinks so.

~ Jeff

Does your bank achieve positive operating leverage? Post regarding expense & efficiency ratios:
http://jeff-for-banks.blogspot.com/2011/05/does-your-bank-achieve-positive.html

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

V-blog: Speaking of economies of scale to NY Bankers

I recently spoke at a New York Bankers Association senior management conference regarding the quest for economies of scale to improve earnings through positive operating leverage. I was the leadoff hitter for a tandem that included a JPMorgan Chase banker. I brought my 21 year-old daughter with me, and thought it might be a good idea for her to use our family camera to video and edit my remarks. See below.


Bottom Line:

Banks and thrifts have not reduced efficiency or expense ratios as they have grown... i.e. they have not achieved economies of scale.

I cited three possibilities why this is so:

     1. Culture/Bureaucratic Attitude;
     2. Fragmented Responsibilities; and
     3. Technology Utilization and We Have Always Done It That Way

The session was based on a white paper I recently wrote for the Financial Managers' Society. See link to the white paper below.

This is my first V-blog and I will get better at it, especially if my daughter provides me guidance.

~ Jeff

Lesson learned: We have to get better at camera positioning!

Link to FMS White Paper on economies of scale and positive operating leverage:
http://www.kafafiangroup.com/PDF/Marsico-Economies-of-Scale.pdf