Friday, November 03, 2023

Guest Post: Financial Markets & Economic Update 4Q23 by Dorothy Jaworski

Financial Markets & Economic Update - Fourth Quarter 2023

  

Summer Update

On this warm October day, I am staring at my Bloomberg screen, still heartbroken over the Phillies Phailure.  Now, all of our hopes ride with the Eagles.  Interest rates are all elevated, with the 2-year Treasury yield at 5.01% and the 10-year at 4.85%, which is up by over 100 basis points since June 30, 2023.  Most of the inversion between these two yields is gone.  The 3-month T-Bill is at 5.45%, so there remains some inversion to the 10-year yield.  Stocks are down again today and have been down all week.  Gold has reclaimed $2,000 per ounce and its status as a safe haven, with all that is going on with war in the Middle East.  Too bad Treasuries are not as much of a safe haven.  Markets sent Treasury yields higher in reaction to huge deficit spending and a Federal Reserve intent on pushing rates higher, keeping them “higher for longer” with large price risk as everyone has learned for the past three years.

Some argue that, because we saw real GDP rise by +4.9% in 3Q23, that the economy is robust and strong.”  Yes, it was for that quarter, but, if you read my last newsletter, the summer of fun meant that quarter would be stronger, as the last stages of pandemic pent-up demand saw excess savings spent with abandon.  YOLO- You Only Live Once!  People traveled on vacations with their newly renewed passports, enjoyed entertainment (can you say Taylor Swift and Barbie?), and ate out at their favorite restaurants.  Now the harsh reality will sink in and El Nino is sure to give us a cold winter.  Inflation is still elevated, even while it slowly declines from 2022’s peaks.  We will continue to fall toward the Fed target of 2.0% but it takes time and patience.

 

Index of Leading Economic Indicators

I just finished studying a chart of the year-over-year changes in the index of leading economic indicators, or “LEI,” going back to 1960.  For every period of sustained y-o-y declines in LEI, recession has either begun or followed quickly.  The LEI fell again in September, 2023 by -.7% and is down y-o-y by -7.8%.  The index began to decline in March, 2022 (no surprise that the Fed started tightening that month), and has been down for 18 months in a row; the LEI is down -11.1% since March, 2022 to 104.6.  In July, 2022, the LEI began to decline y-o-y, yet we have not been in recession or see one imminently.

The chart showed eerily similar patterns of declines in 1990 and 2000-2001.  Unsurprisingly, the largest declines occurred starting monthly in March, 2006 and on a y-o-y basis in September, 2006 and continued to November, 2009.  The largest monthly decline took place in May, 2009 at -27.2% y-o-y with the index reaching a low of 75.7.  We all remember the Great Recession, which began in 2007, but the LEI knew it as early as March, 2006.  This time will be no different and patience is required.

By the way, there are sister indices to the LEI, the coincident for current conditions and the lagging index for 6 to 9 months ago.  Both are relatively stable, indicating the economy has been and currently is okay.

  

Are Rates Restrictive?

Do you remember what it means for Fed policy to be “restrictive?”  It means getting the Fed Funds rate above inflation so that a positive number, or real rate, would result after subtracting inflation from the Fed Funds rate.  Every inflation measure that I track closely is below current Fed Funds of 5.50%, resulting in restrictive rates of varying degrees.

Fed Funds is 1.40% over September’s annual core CPI of 4.1% and 1.80% over annual headline CPI of 3.7%.  Fed Funds is 3.10% over 3Q23 core PCE of 2.40% and 2.60% over the PCE deflator of 2.9%.  Fed Funds is 1.10% over the annualized 3Q23 employment cost index of 1.1% and is 1.30% over the most recent data for wage growth of 4.2%.  So, yes, rates are restrictive.  And the FIBER leading inflation index and M2 money supply are both falling year-over-year, by -1.2% and -3.6% respectively, so inflation will continue to trend downward.  Fed Chairman Powell stated “You know restrictive only when you see it.”  Well, you be the judge… I believe that the Fed is done raising rates; they just don’t know it yet.  And looking ahead to the 2024 Presidential Election, they clearly would want to be on the sidelines.

 

Risks to the Economy

We were growing real GDP 2.1% to 2.7% for the four quarters ended 2Q23 and then experienced an outlier of +4.9% in 3Q23.  Yeah, the summer of fun.  Consumer spending accounted for one-half of GDP.  Businesses built inventories adding 1.30% to GDP.  Housing made a small positive contribution after a string of negative quarters.  Much of the data was weak, so it’s doubtful that we can keep repeating this pace.

The risks are many.  We have an aggressive Fed threatening more rate hikes.  Long-term interest rates just increased by 100 basis points in the past few months, in a time when inflation is falling.  Government spending and huge budget deficits are upsetting investors.  Mortgage rates are now close to 8.00%; affordability is at its lowest point since 1989, according to the National Association of Realtors.  Low inventories of homes has hurt sales.  No one will give up their 3.00% mortgage for an 8.00% one.  Usually high interest rates would put a damper on home price increases and we might expect prices to outright decline.  But not in this market.  Prices are stubbornly high and rising, with August y-o-y increases of +2.2% for the Case Shiller 20, +2.6% for Core Logic, and +5.6% for the FHFA. 

China is having its own economic troubles and supply chains could suffer again.  And what a time for the UAW to go on strike- demanding outsized pay raises and slowing production at the Big Three automakers and hurting their suppliers.  Thankfully, they appear to be close to agreement.  According to Cox, one-half of Americans cannot afford a new car.  Sales will be affected by both the strike and affordability.

Some banks have tightened credit and there is also weakening demand for bank credit as small businesses are hurting from higher costs and higher interest rates.  Huge amounts of government debt and business debt, including commercial real estate, are repricing over the next two years at higher rates.  Real bank credit (excluding inflation) has been falling for the past 12 to 24 months.  Generally, GDP would be falling in this situation.

Finally, one more thought about the Fed.  They have raised interest rates by 5.25% since March, 2022, let almost $1 trillion of their bond portfolio mature without replacement and allowed M2 money supply to decline y-o-y starting in December, 2022 for the first time since the 1940s and at the fastest pace since the 1930s.  September was -3.6% and July and August were both -3.9%.  Leads and lags for M2 changes are thought to be 12 to 18 months.  The Fed has been pushing inflation lower, but, if they really believed in policy lags and looked at the LEI and M2 y-o-y declines, they would ease right now.  I wonder what Maestro would do.

 

Where is Recession?

Be patient.  It will come.  High interest rates- both short-term and long-term- an aggressive Fed, the LEI, and an inverted yield curve are all precursors of a recession.  The yield curve is less inverted than it was earlier this year, due to large increases in longer-term rates.  This actually plays into the recession forecasts.  The inverted curve is the precursor of recession, but it is the re-steepening of the yield curve that is the sign of imminent recession.

I mentioned the LEI earlier.  It has been falling on a monthly and y-o-y pace that is always associated with recessions- big ones and small ones.  Do not ignore this and other indicators as they always teach us something.

M2 is falling.  Inflation is responding by falling.  It was the massive increase in M2 in 2020 and 2021 (and beyond!) along with pandemic-related supply chain disasters that led to inflation.  It will be the decline in M2 that reduces it.  The FIBER leading inflation index is still falling on a y-o-y basis, and is currently -9.2% from its high in March, 2022.

The major surveys, including ISM, S&P, and the local Philly Fed, continue to show weakness in terms of current conditions and outlook.  Inflation has tamed down in most of them.  Stock markets have been very volatile and are mostly down since the summer months.  Are they all sensing that the summer of fun is over?  Profits have been mostly positive for the 3Q23, but probably not enough to make the past 12 months positive.  We shall see.

 

I was in Switzerland in July and I regret that I did not have the time to visit CERN, the home of the Large Hadron Collider.  The LHC has been running heavy ions through the system for the past five weeks, ending on October 30th.  What will we learn from this?  Maybe the LHC really is changing our world, turning economics upside down, and leading to outcomes that are unexpected given our knowledge of the past.  As always, thanks for reading!

 

D. Jaworski 10/28/23



Dorothy Jaworski has worked at large and small banks for over 30 years; much of that time has been spent in investment portfolio management, risk management, and financial analysis. Dorothy has been with Penn Community Bank and its predecessor since November, 2004. She is the author of Just Another Good Soldier, and Honoring Stephen Jaworski, which details the 11th Infantry Regiment's WWII crossing of the Moselle River where her uncle, Pfc. Stephen W. Jaworski, gave his last full measure of devotion.



Monday, October 30, 2023

3 Ideas for Your Deposit Strategy

The 2022-23 Fed monetary tightening caused disruption to our depositor base. We either lost deposits to Treasuries, money market mutual funds, or disintermediated into higher cost deposits within our bank. In this video short, I suggest three ideas to improve your deposit strategy as follows:


1. Identify "dead money" in your depositor base and pro-actively deepen your relationship with them.


2. Create "companion accounts", as described by our friend Neil Stanley from The CorePoint, to lure the money we've lost back into our bank.


3. Manage the mix. Determine which accounts are "accumulation" versus "store of value."


Listen to the three-and-a-half-minute video for greater context. Or contact me at jmarsico@kafafiangroup.com or 717.468.3208. 


What are your ideas for a deposit strategy? 





Sunday, September 24, 2023

A Banker's Dream Dashboard

We talk about what we would like our bank to be, to our customers, employees, community and shareholders (if we have them). We build a strategy that is more often than not preaching differentiation versus cost advantage. We analyze our customers, markets, and our personnel to devise a plan that has the potential to deliver to our stakeholders.

Then we go back to our day-to-day and do none of the things we talked about. We go back to managing support functions on their budget, delaying strategic investments that could make them more scalable, efficient, and not people-dependent to mitigate the threat of the availability of talent. Because the investment wouldn't yield results until the end of year two, and we got a budget to keep.

We go back to incenting lenders on volume, even though we have a strategic aspiration of being in the top quartile of net interest margin. Our brand, according to our latest Net Promoter Score, should allow us to succeed at not having to be "best price." But we incent on volume because, hey, lenders are accustomed to volume goals, and we can't measure spreads per lender. 

We measure branch managers on deposit growth or open-close ratios. Again, it's easy to pull those numbers. And branch managers don't have the sophistication to understand a branch profit and loss statement, right? And we can't measure that anyway.

So our accountabilities fall on the same old things that are not particularly in alignment with our strategy and likely have unintended consequences that hold us back. 

You manage what you measure. And we are selling ourselves, our people, our customers and shareholders short by only measuring what our systems can do. Imagine if a branch manager owned their P&L, and therefore were empowered to make rate exceptions, fee decisions, and budget decisions that are balanced to continuously improve the profitability of their branch. It would certainly bring customers closer to decision makers, which can be a competitive advantage for the community financial institution if only it benefitted from strategic execution.

As I see it, holding employees accountable for their actions, all the way down the line, consistent with strategy, will build that execution culture so many institutions crave. Yet it remains elusive. It doesn't have to be.

I've constructed a branch dashboard that I think will motivate branch people to work every day at improving the financial performance of their branch, and therefore the bank, while giving them ownership of decision-making to benefit all stakeholders.















Imagine that conversation with the regional manager or retail executive about how to improve the numbers that they see everyday on the dashboard. They would know those customers with the highest deposit balances yet not the highest cost of deposits. Keeping those customers satisfied would do much more to help branch profitability than the rate shopper that wants top of market. That would drive up the branches cost of deposits, decrease its spread, and profitability. But the high balance customer that doesn't demand top rate, but competitive rate, is worth knowing and increasing deposit costs to maintain that relationship.

Now, we wait until that customer calls to complain. That's our strategy. Wait for our high balance yet profitable customer to call and complain about the terribly low rate we are paying them. It's an unsustainable strategy. Empower our relationship managers to make decisions that balance the needs of stakeholders. 

But to do that, we must measure consistent with our strategy. And reward those top quartile performers we know are at our bank. If we only measured to be consistent with what we believe we know. If we don't measure it, we can't manage to it. 

We can measure it, and should.


~ Jeff

Friday, July 28, 2023

Career in Banking Advice from The Pro's

I recently moderated a Risk Management Association (RMA) panel focused on managing risk in today's environment. Since the panel were seasoned bankers, the audience also wanted to hear some nuggets of wisdom about managing their careers in banking.

The question I asked: If you could give career advice to your 25 year-old self, what would it be?

The panelists were: 

Mike Allen, President of Harford Bank. A career banker with multiple financial institutions, including the long-admired Mercantile from Maryland, Mike elevated up the credit and lending vertical to his current position.

Kevin Benson, President of Rosedale Federal S&L Association. Kevin was a regulator before becoming senior lender at Rosedale, and ultimately to his current position.

Mark Semanie, Maryland Market President, Wesbanco. I first met Mark when he was CFO of a community bank, rising to COO of a different bank that was acquired by Wesbanco, giving way to his current position. Mark did not come into banking until his mid 30's.

Three great leaders, all from different backgrounds. Here is my take on how they responded to my career advice question.






Thursday, July 13, 2023

Sins of Our SIFI

Another day, another big bank faux paus. On July 10, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a consent order (CO) against Bank of America, N.A. (BofA), claiming, among other things, that BofA opened credit card accounts for new customers without their consent. The next day, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), exacted a $60 million fine for prior sins that were based on a 2022 exam and subsequent consent order regarding double fees charged to customers as a result of ACH representments.

Not a red-letter day for BofA.

But can it be for the community banks that would covet the customers that make up the $1.9 trillion in BofA deposits?

If past is prologue, we shouldn't get too excited. Wells Fargo was slapped with a similar CO back in 2016, while they were third in the nation in deposit market share. They're still third. Even though a subsequent CO limited their growth to under five percent. The good news is they only grew deposits 2.1% annually, while others in the top 10 deposit market share averaged 7.1% annual growth. But still, Wells grew deposits $169 billion since receiving their 2016 fake account order, which has been subsequently lifted.



So, as I told a banking friend, however community financial institutions react to BofA's wrongdoing, or don't react, it should be different than what we did in reaction to Wells' 2016 CO.

It's not like the BofA news isn't bad. Let me give you some of the CFPB language in the CO in Article IV, subsections 24-31:


Respondent's (BofA) Violations of Law Regarding Account-Opening Practices

24. During the Account-Opening Findings Period, Respondent offered an array of Consumer Financial Products or Services, including savings and checking accounts (deposit accounts) and credit cards.

25. During the Account-Opening Findings Period, one factor that Respondent considered when evaluating financial center employees’ overall performance and incentive compensation was the number of new Consumer Financial Products or Services that were opened and used by the consumer.

26. During the Account-Opening Findings Period, in response to sales pressure or to obtain incentive rewards, Respondent’s employees sometimes submitted applications for and issued credit cards without consumers’ consent. These acts or practices were contrary to Respondent’s policies and procedures and involved a small percentage of Respondent’s new accounts.

27. It was Respondent’s practice to obtain consumer reports in the course of considering consumers for new credit cards.

28. Respondent used or obtained consumer reports to consider consumers for new credit cards even when the consumers had not applied for or did not want the products and where Respondent did not otherwise have a permissible purpose for the consumer reports.

29. During the Account-Opening Findings Period, Respondent sometimes generated associated fees from credit card accounts opened without consumers’ consent. 

30. Respondent’s acts or practices described herein may have negatively impacted consumers including through fees charged; impacts to consumer credit profiles; the loss of control over personal identifying information; the expenditure of consumer time and effort investigating the facts and seeking closure of unwanted accounts; and the need to monitor and mitigate harm going forward.

31. Respondent has addressed a root cause of Relevant Account-Opening Practices—individual sales goals and sales-based compensation—by eliminating sales goals both for compensation incentives and for performance management for financial center employees primarily responsible for the sale of consumer credit card accounts as of January 1, 2023.


So What?

In a separate CO, the OCC cited violations of law against BofA for charging customers a $35 overdraft fee, and if re-presented by merchants the next day and there were still insufficient funds, charged an additional $35 fee for the same item. This practice was said to have ended in 2021.

Representment issues and the disclosures were recently a regulatory hot-button issue in bank exams. And, truth be told, others may have done it without even knowing it was being done. These double-fees were not very big to a traditional community financial institution and it is possible when the deposit accounts were set up, they were not set up to identify representments when automatically assessing fees. 

But still, the timing of the CO coinciding with the fake accounts opened as a result of the sales culture within BofA is certainly a bad look.

The question; will this bad look result in community financial institutions finally making a successful case to younger depositors and small businesses that their deposit dollars belong with them and not the SIFI banks?

I hope so. But hope is not a strategy.


~ Jeff


Monday, June 12, 2023

Does Your Bank Matter?

My firm is debating the direction of the banking industry so we can present, discuss, and debate with our clients, particularly how they can succeed in the current and emerging environment. In the past, I have advocated for "stakeholder primacy"; if you mattered to your employees, customers, shareholders and communities you would surely have an enduring future. If an enduring future is what you aspire to.

If you mattered to your employees, your retention rate for those you want to retain will be greater than your competitors. Higher retention usually means greater employee satisfaction through employee development, engagement and empowerment, career opportunities, competitive compensation and benefits, work-life balance, and overall satisfaction with how your bank is making a difference. These higher performing employees reduce process friction and customer pain points, delivering a superior customer experience.

If you matter to customers, you would understand their individual needs and deliver banking services to them without them having to think about it or worry about it. If they have an issue, they know who to call and that person is empowered to solve it for them without being bounced around. They are comfortable that their bank and banker will balance the needs of the customer with the needs of the bank and its other constituencies. They feel good banking with you because you serve some higher purpose in your community. They won't dump you for small rate variation or loan terms. They are your greatest promoters, reducing new customer acquisition time and resources.

If you matter to your community(s), you would be missed if your bank was not there. If you are dedicated to elevating the financial wellbeing of your customers, for example, then their net worth and overall financial happiness will improve over the long term. You help elevate those in need to a sustainable level. You lift low-to-mod income households to middle class households, and so on. You are committed to the financial literacy of all that bank with you. Yes, without your bank, there would be a hole in your community. 

Better employees that stay with you to serve your higher purpose in your community are delivering a superior customer experience to customers that are comfortable paying you for the service you deliver and the value you bring to them and the community. This delivers superior financial performance to shareholders. I've discussed how to calculate earning your right to remain independent in a prior post, and banks should do this regularly to ensure they are holding themselves accountable to deliver to shareholders.

But the brass ring is to matter not just to shareholders. But to matter to all of your stakeholders.

Below is a list of the largest of the 223 bank merger deals that happened in 2013. Ten years ago. Do stakeholders miss these banks? When you build your strategy, build one where you will be missed if you were gone. It's a great legacy.


~ Jeff










































Friday, June 02, 2023

Predicting the Next Banking Crisis Is a Fool’s Game. Not Learning From the Last One: Equally Foolish

 //Jeff Marsico remarks to the 2023 New Jersey Bankers' Association Annual Convention: May 19, 2023//


Four decades ago, the prolonged savings-and-loan crisis devastated the industry. Between 1980 and 1995, more than 2,900 banks and thrifts with collective assets of more than $2.2 trillion failed. More recently and by comparison, the mortgage meltdown and subsequent global financial crisis took down more than 500 banks between 2007 and 2014, with total assets of nearly $959 billion.

Outside of those two crisis periods, American banking failures have generally been uncommon, at least since the end of the Great Depression. Between 1941 and 1979, an average of 5.3 banks failed a year. There was an average of 4.3 bank failures per year between 1996 and 2006, and 3.6 between 2015 and 2022. Before SVB, Signature, and First Republic, in fact, it had been over two years since the last bank failure.

Because our industry has been fairly stable except for a few extraordinary periods, doesn’t mean we can’t learn from tough times as both crises had long germination times and were predicated on factors that were both known and observable. 

The recession of 1990 was caused, in part, to the decade-long S&L crisis. The crisis stemmed from a variety of factors, but none contributed to the meltdown more than inflation and the attendant interest rate increase. The early 1980s was a difficult time for the United States, as consumers faced rising prices, high unemployment, and the effects of a supply shock—an oil embargo—which caused energy prices to skyrocket. The result was stagflation, a toxic environment of rising prices and declining growth, sinking the economy into recession.

To fight inflation, the Fed raised rates aggressively (familiar?). And S&L’s had long-term, lower yielding mortgages funded by shorter term deposits. The old borrow short, lend long strategy. Struggling to raise asset yields, S&L’s turned to commercial real estate, junk bonds, even art to combat rising deposit costs. 

I want to read to you the FDIC’s conclusion from their An Examination of the Banking Crisis of the 1980’s and Early 1990’s. This will be fun.


“The regulatory lessons of the S&L disaster are many. First and foremost is the need for strong and effective supervision of insured depository institutions, particularly if they are given new or expanded powers or are experiencing rapid growth. Second, this can be accomplished only if the industry does not have too much influence over its regulators and if the regulators have the ability to hire, train, and retain qualified staff. In this regard, the bank regulatory agencies need to remain politically independent. Third, the regulators need adequate financial resources. Although the Federal Home Loan Bank System was too close to the industry it regulated during the early years of the crisis and its policies greatly contributed to the problem, the Bank Board had been given far too few resources to supervise effectively an industry that was allowed vast new powers. Fourth, the S&L crisis highlights the importance of promptly closing insolvent, insured financial institutions in order to minimize potential losses to the deposit insurance fund and to ensure a more efficient financial marketplace. Finally, resolution of failing financial institutions requires that the deposit insurance fund be strongly capitalized with real reserves, not just federal guarantee.”


My lesson learned to the regulators, read your past lessons learned. To you, manage your interest rate risk. Before becoming desperate and trading interest rate risk for credit risk. This crisis hatched the more sophisticated ALCO tools we have today. Currently, not many (if any) financial institutions have experienced negative spread as they did in the early 80’s. Yet.


The dot-com bubble recession began in March 2001 and lasted only 8 months. High-tech employment fell from 12.1 percent of all jobs in 2001 to 11.3 percent in 2004, a decline of 1.1 million jobs, as the high-tech sector was harder hit by the bursting of the bubble and its aftermath than other sectors of the economy. By comparison, non-high-tech industries lost 689,000 jobs between 2001 and 2002 but recovered the lost jobs by 2004.

What caused a dot-com bubble? In the late 90s, low interest rates made speculative equity investments more attractive than bonds, and at the same time, innovative internet companies grew in popularity among retail investors, professional traders, venture capitalists, and the like (familiar?). When the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 passed, the top capital gains tax rate was lowered, providing yet another incentive for equity speculators to pour money into the fledgling internet industry. The Y2K scare also had companies pouring money into tech firms.

Between 1995 and its peak in March 2000, the Nasdaq Composite stock market index rose 800%, only to fall 740% from its peak by October 2002, giving up all its gains during the bubble. Lesson learned, meteoric rises are often accompanied by gravitational falls. And it is so difficult to be the odd-one out at the cocktail party full of those that participated in the ascent… during the ascent. Taking your own punch bowl away when the party is getting good takes fortitude.


The Great Recession, in contrast to the relatively short dot-com bubble recession, officially lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, the longest recession since the Great Depression. What caused it? Economists cite as the main culprit the collapse of the subprime mortgage market — defaults on high-risk housing loans — which led to a credit crunch in the global banking system and a precipitous drop in bank lending. Who would’ve thought lending $1 million to a San Francisco cab driver to buy a house at 100% loan to value would go bad?

And quite frankly, I did not know there were so many tranches to mortgage-backed securities. Although community banks did not lend to sub-prime borrowers in any meaningful way, did we participate? In many respects, community banks were caught in the cross-fire through the purchase of those mbs instruments – and subsequent trial through public sentiment. We took a serious reputational hit. 

According to the FDIC, the causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis lay partly in the housing boom and bust of the mid-2000s; partly in the degree to which the U.S. and global financial systems had become highly concentrated, interconnected, and opaque; and partly in the innovative products and mechanisms that combined to link homebuyers in the United States with financial firms and investors across the world. Capiche? (credit default swaps anyone?).

In 1991 FDICIA was passed into law. It had a provision that prohibited assistance to failing banks if FDIC funds would be used to protect uninsured depositors and other creditors (hmm, think about that in light of recent events)—but the act also contained a provision allowing an exception to the prohibition when the failure of an institution would pose a systemic risk.

In 2008, by relying on the provision that allowed a systemic risk exception, the FDIC took two actions that maintained financial institutions’ access to funding: the FDIC guaranteed bank debt and, for certain types of transaction accounts, provided an unlimited deposit insurance guarantee. In addition, the FDIC and the other federal regulators used the systemic risk exception to extend extraordinary support to some of the largest financial institutions in the country in order to prevent their disorderly failure, setting precedent for what we now know as Too Big to Fail (TBTF), or Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI).

Although community banks did not play a significant role in subprime lending, the runup and subsequent decline in real estate values had a profound impact on their safety and soundness. Most of the more than 500 financial institutions that failed were community banks. When your construction loan is greater than what a builder can reasonably recover, when your home or commercial mortgage is larger than its value, you’re going to have bad loans. We knew there was tremendous hubris in the subprime market. We thought since we were only tangential players, we were insulated. What we found out is the interconnectedness of real estate values and the contagion that it can cause. 

Remember K Bank in Maryland? In 2006, the then $686 million in asset bank made $8.8 million, or 1.38% on assets and 16.38% on equity. They were killing it in construction and development loans. At industry events they had that wry grin saying, “yeah, we perform better than you.” After losses of $24 and $23 million, respectively in 2008 and 09, the regulators in 2010 said enough is enough. M&T assumed their $411 million of loans and securities with a $289 million FDIC loss-share agreement. Let those numbers sink in a bit. It didn’t take long for the profit GOAT to become, well, an actual pig. Lesson learned, beware of how a runup in asset prices might impact your assets and diversify accordingly. 


After the Great Recession, we had over 10 years of economic expansion, albeit anemic economic expansion. Economists were rubbing their crystal balls trying to accurately predict when the next recession would begin so that they could seal their celebrity on CNBC. But it never came. Instead, Covid came.


So many extraordinary things happened during Covid that I’m not certain if they will ever repeat themselves in our lifetimes. Most lessons were for bureaucrats. I think we have enough experience to know bureaucrats don’t learn well. They learn short, forget long. 

A substantial yet brief recession ensued. Followed by extraordinary government support that came in multiple trillion dollar plus fiscal stimulus packages so competing administrations could outdo one another on government assistance funded by ridiculous sums of debt, largely purchased by the Fed. Money supply expanded wildly. This amount of stimulus shielded our loan books from experiencing any material losses.  

And what happens when the government prints money? Inflation. I think I learned that in economics 101 or reading anything written by Milton Friedman. Perhaps bureaucrats would benefit from a brief stroll through an econ book. Not written by Paul Krugman.

Recall that the S&L crisis was caused, in part, by inflation and the subsequent rapid rise in interest rates orchestrated by the Fed. Well, this time, the Fed raised rates faster because they misdiagnosed inflation as transient. Or, the cynic might read it as, our Chairman is up for renomination and we won’t raise rates until he owns the gavel.  


The Fed Funds rate was zero in December 2021. It didn’t take a rocket scientist to predict rates would go up. And we positioned our balance sheets accordingly. And in December 2021 our liquidity positions were so strong we didn’t know what to do with the money. Good times.

Some of us took our liquidity and bought longer-term bonds – at historically high prices - to try and increase yield. Most banks consider their securities portfolio as first and foremost for liquidity. When you elevate yield over liquidity, bad things can happen. Don’t get me wrong, giving up yield for liquidity could also be bad. But there are different degrees of bad. But, no worries, right, AOCI was excluded in regulatory capital ratio calculations, and we could hide some of that interest rate risk in HTM securities. 

Then we realized we needed a special exemption from our FHLB’s regulator to borrow money from our FHLB if our GAAP equity or tangible equity was below zero. I remember being at a Bank CEO Network event in Denver when CEO’s learned of this knowledge nugget. Some seemed panicked. 

But we still had plenty of liquidity, right? Rates were rising fast, but we weren’t raising our deposit rates accordingly. Our deposit betas were phenomenally low. We thought our customers would stay with our bank, no matter what.  We bragged about it in our earnings releases.

Then depositors woke up. First municipalities and larger commercial customers, and more sophisticated retail depositors. Even I started to wake up. I don’t get angry at my bank that often, but when I found out I was earning .01 percent on my money market account when the Fed Funds rate rose to five, I was angry. My bank was taking advantage of me because I didn’t babysit my money. They will not be my bank for long.  I – like many – will use technology to move my money but keep my account open – costing the bank money.  

But what of SVB, Signature, and First Republic? Three different banks and business models. All were enviable in some sort of way. All suffered extraordinary runs on their bank due to large unrealized losses on both HTM and AFS securities, peculiarities in the p/e world, uninsured deposits, crypto, and old school panic via new school technologies and social media. 

For community banks, it’s not as much about the uninsured deposits or even the AOCI. We were concerned about the panic. The extraordinary measures taken by our government and us in employee and depositor communications, makes panic less likely.

Our pressure on deposits was because we let the difference between what we paid depositors and what they could earn in alternatives become too large. And we should’ve been able to predict this – but we did not want to be honest and thought our customers were all ours. At the end of tightening cycles, deposit betas have risen like hockey sticks. And given the transparency of deposit pricing and the ease of moving money from our bank to alternatives, why did we think it would be different?


Our lesson learned in this most recent crisis, in my opinion: don’t let market rates get too far ahead of what you pay depositors, unless you think it’s worth those two or three quarters of superior cost of funds to aggravate your depositors and force them to seek alternatives and lose trust in you. Be extremely cautious elevating yield over liquidity in your securities portfolio… I would’ve liked to have been a fly on the wall at SVB when they decided to deploy their extraordinary liquidity position in long-term (and relatively low yielding) bonds without hedge. Revise our contingency funding plans to ensure that the liquidity will be available if 400 of our banking friends are waiting in line at the same time and at the same window. And ensure our business continuity plans or crisis management plans includes a communication plan to employees and customers to restore confidence in our bank even when confidence in banking has been shaken.

So, to summarize my lessons learned from every crisis in the last 35 years:


- Manage your interest rate risk;

- Meteoric rises are often accompanied by gravitational falls. Recognize the rise;

- Beware of how a runup in asset prices might impact your assets and diversify accordingly;

- Don’t let market rates get too far ahead of what you pay depositors;

- Be extremely cautious elevating yield over liquidity in your securities portfolio;

- Revise our contingency funding plans to ensure that the liquidity will be available if there is a run on your liquidity resources; 

- Ensure our business continuity plans or crisis management plans includes a communication plan to employees and customers to restore confidence in our bank.


So what of the next crisis? Will it be non-residential real estate? We’ve had pretty frothy real estate runups – in terms of rental rates and insurance expenses despite increasing vacancy rates. Will it be commercial office space as the pandemic chased workers out of office buildings only to have them slowly return, if they return at all? Will it be retail commercial real estate, as the pandemic accelerated our preference for online shopping making zombie mall owners desperately looking for alternatives? Spread of the Ukraine war? 

So many questions that we at The Kafafian Group toyed with the idea of having a fun conference to debate emerging risks to banking called “Predictapalooza” where we would have industry pro’s stand up and make some “what if’s” to help us shape our risk management practices. Outside the box what if’s, such as what are the chances and how should we prepare for, I don’t know, a worldwide pandemic?


I don’t know what the next crisis will be. And I’m skeptical about those that say they know.


What I do know is that almost everyone in this room has been through every crisis I discussed. They were all different. They all forced us to learn from them and make adjustments on how we managed our balance sheet and our banks. And they’ve all made us better bankers and more capable to handle what “crisis” comes next.


We learn and we move on. It’s all we can do.