Showing posts with label financial performance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label financial performance. Show all posts

Friday, December 27, 2024

Financial Metrics of Credit Unions vs. Banks

I often hear that credit unions (or mutual banks) don't have to maximize profits because they don't have shareholders.

This is technically correct. Shareholders demand a return in the form of capital appreciation on the stock and the dividends paid per share, also known as total shareholder return (TSR). Credit Unions, however, do have owners that they call members. Members may pay little attention to the increase or decrease in the value of what they own because they are comfortable under the umbrella of NCUA insurance (much like depositors with FDIC insurance). This comfort might not make them salivate in anticipation of their CUs next quarterly Call Report. Members rarely hold CU executives accountable for financial performance.

But financial performance has meaning. Credit Unions primary source of capital is retained earnings. And if they have sub-optimal profits because of a lack of expense or pricing discipline, there is less retained earnings and therefore less capital to support growth or serve as a buffer for hard times. 

In addition, if CUs are inefficient and squander resources deep in the bowels of their infrastructure, there is less for members/depositors, employees, or their communities, i.e., their stakeholders. In this sense, TSR has a different meaning: total stakeholder returns. For example, some credit unions pay special dividends to depositors if they have good earnings and sufficient capital.

This month Robins Financial Credit Union, a $4.6 billion in asset CU in Georgia, paid a $20 million member rebate, representing about $74 per member and 45 basis points of its ROA. The reason they did it: their YTD ROA was 1.31% and their net worth/assets was 16.12%. Combine that with a clean balance sheet (0.41% delinquent loans/total loans) and there were ample resources to return that solid performance to their members. It's their money, right?

But the CUs that don't deliver that performance or have that capital position and strong balance sheet, management teams and trustees are reticent to return that money to members. Or other stakeholders for that matter.

Below is a series of charts that compares and contrasts the financial performance of banks + thrifts and credit unions with between $1 billion and $10 billion in total assets. Banks were controlled for those with less than 20% of their loan portfolio in commercial real estate loans to mitigate the differences in bank vs credit union balance sheets. This yielded only 118 banks because of the commercial loan restriction, versus 319 credit unions. I used medians so a few outsized banks or CUs didn't skew an average. The median-sized bank was $2.1 billion in total assets and the median CU was $2.2 billion. 

Here are the results (courtesy of S&P Capital IQ):




 



















Banks had a 41 basis points year-to-date advantage (1.00% vs .59%) in ROAA although banks pay federal taxes. Apply that to the median CU size of our sample ($2.2B in total assets) and that equates to $9 million. Perhaps that disadvantage is precisely because the measured CUs pay a special dividend to members, although banks' cost of interest-bearing liabilities was 1.21% more than CUs. Perhaps the salary and benefits per FTE is greater at CUs than banks, or their community support costs more. This we can't tell from the above charts. 

CUs will have to reflect on if that is true. 

Is it true that the 82 basis points disadvantage to banks in year-to-date non-interest expense to average assets, which equates to $18 million, is because CUs pay their people more, or provide that much more in community support?

Whether you have shareholders or not, running your business for the benefit of stakeholders should be your guiding star. You are doing stakeholders no favors by running it sub-optimally and wasting resources on inefficiencies deep in the bowels of your organization. Wouldn't it be great to have a full end-of-year bonus pool where you reward your most productive and loyal employees, have the pricing discipline to deliver a special dividend to your most loyal core depositors, or be able to meet some social needs in your community?

Profit performance matters, no matter which stakeholder(s) you favor.


Happy New Year to my readers!


~ Jeff


Note: My firm does two things to help create the culture for more optimal profit performance for financial institutions: 1) Profitability Measurement-we measure the profitability of lines of business and products on an outsourced basis so management teams can measure and maintain accountabilities for profit trends at much more granular levels than their Call Report; and 2) Process Improvement- we dispatch a team to analyze processes, resource and technology utilization and make recommendations for greater efficiencies. This is sometimes tough to do internally due to resource constraints and experiences outside of the organization. Follow the links to learn more or reach out to me. 


Thursday, February 01, 2024

How Did Banks Fare During Fed Tightening?

Now that the debate is turning from Fed tightening to when the Fed will start dropping rates, we took a look at how financial institutions fared during the tightening cycle, using the quarter ended December 31, 2021 as the base period. The Fed began tightening at its March 17, 2022 meeting with a 25 basis points increase in the Fed Funds Rate and ended July 26, 2023.

Before providing observations, here are some relevant ratios that I reviewed for all U.S. banks and savings banks (not S&Ls), amounting to over 4,000 institutions, and divided them up into asset size cohorts. 









Deposit declines, much talked about in the media and banking circles, was limited to those financial institutions over $50 billion in total assets. All other asset cohorts grew deposits during the Fed's tightening.

If you look at the liquidity ratios during 4Q21, you may note that no matter the asset size, financial institutions were flush with liquidity, mostly as a result of government stimulus. If the government prints trillions of dollars, it is bound to end up in bank accounts. This is when only the most farsighted bankers were executing a funding strategy. We just didn't need the funding. Seems bizarre typing that last sentence.

The liquidity ratio calculation: (Cash & Due + Securities + Fed Funds Sold & Repos - Pledged Securities) / Total Liabilities

And look how the liquidity ratios tumbled. This data is from Call Reports. And for 1Q23, that would be period end March 31, 2023, post SVB and Signature failures. Every asset size cohort declined from 4Q22 to 1Q23, and from 1Q23 to 2Q23. Aside from the trend though, financial institutions maintained manageable liquidity ratios. The under $1B and over $50B entered the tightening cycle with 35% liquidity ratios. They ended it in the low 20's. Still strongly liquid. The challenge was that the dramatic increase in interest rates decreased the value of securities, and bankers therefore didn't want to sell them and turn a hypothetical loss into an actual one.

They were what I termed "psychologically illiquid." And today you see that playing out as fourth quarter earnings come out and many banks are taking losses in their securities portfolio to bolster liquidity and pay down high-cost borrowings.

The last increase in Fed Funds came at the beginning of the third quarter 2023 with a 25 basis points increase. During the quarter, the financial institutions over $50B experienced a 24 bps cost of funds increase. The $10B-$50B cohort experienced a 37 bps increase. I anticipate when we run this for fourth quarter all cohorts will increase in cost of funds, but at a slower pace as the gap narrows between actual Fed Funds and bank deposits. The Fed Funds is close to what a depositor could get in a money market mutual fund or short-term treasury. 

Net interest margins increased for every asset sized cohort between 4Q21 and 3Q23, except for the anomalous $1B-$5B group. This might surprise readers. But those sizable liquidity ratios in 4Q21 were as a result of ballooned investment portfolios earning under 2%. The prescient bankers had them in 1.5% short-term securities. Others reached to squeeze more margin and this move proved costly. 

The highest NIM cohort at 3Q23 was $5B-$10B who, coincidentally, had the lowest liquidity ratio at 4Q21. In other words, they didn't have to extend their investment portfolio to squeeze out 25-50 bps more because they had a relatively larger loan book. Those financial institutions cost of funds increased more than those smaller than them, but less than those larger than them. So their battle to maintain funding impacted them similarly to all others even though they were technically less liquid. 

Perhaps because they were not psychologically illiquid. 

Bankers often ask what size I think they should be to generate efficient profitability. My answer is that it is different by geography, strategy, and management teams. In the Midwest, where NIMs tend to be larger and costly infrastructures smaller, a bank can be smaller and efficiently profitable. Look at some of their profit numbers there. In the Northeast, where competition is significant and NIMs are smaller and expenses are greater, you have to be larger.

In terms of asset sizes throughout the country, you see Efficiency Ratios declining as asset sizes increase. In terms of the Expense Ratios (non-interest exp./AA), the $5B-$10B cohort is best. This may be the last sized cohort that has an over 80% reliance on net interest income for revenue. As you get larger, there are more significant fee-based contributions which typically add expense to this ratio but do not add assets, driving Expense Ratios up.   

We did measure top quartile for each of the above ratios and in terms of Expense Ratios, nearly every size category hovered at or below 2% for top quartile performers. If bankers consider their money no different than the bank down the street and can't convince customers that they should pay higher (or accept lower in terms of deposits) for service, convenience, local decision making, speed, relationships, reliability (think PPP) and deposit dollars being invested in their communities, then sub 2% Expense Ratios will likely be the new norm. And size plays an important role in driving down that number.

Size also plays a role in trading multiples, as I wrote about in 2018 (link: Jeff For Banks: The Real Reason for Bank Scale: Trading Multiples (jeff4banks.com)).




Back then, price-to-tangible book multiples were nearly equal for $5B-$10B banks and the largest banks. Not today. And the highest p/e multiples at this January 9th cut were in the $10B-$50B cut. Bank valuations are wonky at this writing and it is difficult to make any conclusions. But if you have enough trading volume to allow investors to get in and out without moving the market, you would be at an advantage from those that have little liquidity. Individual investors continue to yield ground to institutional investors and those funds need to be able to exit. And if sale is the only way they can exit, then consolidation is sure to pick up.

Those are my observations. I would enjoy hearing yours.


~ Jeff



Saturday, January 13, 2018

For Banks, What Is Top Quartile Performance?

What is top quartile financial performance? I am often asked this question, and top quartile performance appears as stretch goals in many strategic plans. And I say bravo! Nobody wants to be average.

Usually top quartile performance is compared to a bank's or thrift's pre-selected peer group. Executive compensation is often tied to it.

I won't belabor the point. A key benefit of being a blogger is that I can use research I perform for my own knowledge to benefit my readers. 

The below statistics are from all FDIC insured financial institutions either for the year-to-date ended or period ended September 30, 2017. This period end was largely driven by the significant number of financial institutions taking deferred tax asset write downs in the fourth quarter, which would have skewed ROAA/ROAE for the year ended 2017. I used Call Report data, so the calendar year is the fiscal year.

I also excluded extraneous performers by category, as noted in the footnotes of each table. For profitability numbers (ROAA, ROAE), I excluded Subchapter S financial institutions. Quite a large cohort at over 1,900. Sub S bankers can gross up those numbers to come up with their equivalents.

See where your financial institution ranks!












Saturday, February 06, 2016

A Financial Institution Investment Banker Had Questions. Here Are My Answers.

My colleagues and I are frequent speakers at industry events. At one such event, a financial institution investment banker approached my colleague and handed him a list of questions he would like answered during his speech. My colleague gave it to me the next day, and I provided my answers thinking he wanted them. Not really. Just thought I would be interested in the questions. So I think: Blog Post!

The list of questions read like the script used to convince banks they can't go it alone. But I'm a cynic. And should give the investment banker the benefit of the doubt. Here we go...


1. What should a financial institution's target levels be in the following?

Return on Tangible Equity (ROTE): ROTE is a crap ratio. Not my term, but one told to me by a bank stock analyst, and I agree with him. If you don't want intangibles, don't do premium deals. If it was such a good deal, then measure ROE. ROTE is just an investment banker talking buyers into doing expensive deals and to not be accountable for the intangible.  

But to answer the ROE question, the long-term average should be >10%. Why? Because an investor in an equity security should expect a 10+% total return. So it serves as a proxy, of sorts. It is different, for each bank however. What if a bank trades at 125% of book? Then a slightly greater than 10% ROE would be required to deliver a 10% total return. It's math.

Note that I said long-term ROE because it should be better in a strong, expanding economy and worse in recessions AND periods of strategic investment. Dropping ROE to 8% to make strategic investments so the financial institution can elevate it to 11% makes total sense to the CEO and Board that manages for long-term performance. Not so much to the CEO and Board worried about his/her next analysts' call.

Tangible Equity/Assets: This depends on the financial institution's risk profile. They should calculate their unique "well-capitalized" by estimating the risk on their balance sheet per balance sheet item, now and as projected. I like the Basel III approach of setting a base level that they don't want to go below (4.5% in Basel III's case) with a 2.5% buffer in place in good times so when times are not so good, the buffer serves its purpose. But the risk buffer should be set by each institution based on the risk on their balance sheet and projected to be on their balance sheet. My guess is that if every bank did this, their target capital range (base + buffer) would be between 7%-9%.

ROA: Greater than 1% should be achievable by most financial institutions, as so many are currently doing it. For institutions with meaningful fee-based businesses, the number should be greater because a profitable fee-based business will deliver "return", without adding "assets".

Efficiency Ratio: This is totally dependent on the business model and growth trajectory. Not many investors complained about the old Commerce Bank (NJ) efficiency ratio of 70+% when they were delivering 20+% profit growth.

Organic Growth Rates: If they exceed their markets, then they are above average, right? So it depends, in large part on their markets. Earnings growth should exceed balance sheet growth. That's positive operating leverage that so many financial institutions struggle with. Earnings growth plus dividend yield should be close to or exceed 10%, in my opinion. If markets can't support it, expand, take it from the competition, or acquire!


2. What is the total non-interest expense to have full internal staffing? 

I have no idea how to answer this one Mr. Investment Banker.


3. What is a financial institution's cost of equity? 

I bet he was looking for a CAPM calculation, as I see this often in investment bankers' presentations. But no. I'm a simple man.

For slower growth, conservatively run banks I would estimate ~10%. For fast growth and/or banks pursuing a higher risk strategy, I would estimate 13%+ for common equity, as investors should demand more for that business model. For convertible preferred, I would estimate the coupon until the conversion date, then the cost of common equity. If it is not mandatorily convertible, then it's the coupon plus the cost of common equity mentioned above. Convertible preferreds are ridiculously expensive because they dilute common returns while sitting back clipping coupons, in my opinion.


4. What asset size is critical mass? 

You know when there is a rule, and someone throws up an exception to the rule that might represent 1% of the total universe subject to that rule? Banking has plenty of exceptions to the critical mass asset size estimates bandied about by bankers, consultants, and investment bankers. My firm's first podcast highlighted the average size of all Sub S banks in the US as $273 million. Small. Yet their average ROA was 1.36%. Sub S banks represent ~ 1/3 of all financial institutions in the US. 

So there are myriads of exceptions to the economies of scale conventional wisdom. I would say, however, that banks with <$500MM in total assets have unique challenges relating to technology investments, stock liquidity, and management succession that will make things difficult. They also suffer significant stock trading discounts to larger banks, even though they may perform better. The change in community bank shareholders from retail to institutional also works against smaller banks, as institutional shareholders typically have float requirements (i.e. so many shares must trade per day). That's where the small banks challenges lie, in my opinion. Not in their ability to deliver superior financial performance. Because they are doing it.


5. Should banks form a bank holding company (BHC)?

I've already taken up enough of my readers' time than to answer this boring investment banker question.


What are your opinions of the above questions?


~ Jeff