Top 5 Total Return to Shareholders: #4 Bank of the Ozarks

I was recently moderating a strategic planning discussion with a multi-billion dollar in assets financial institution. During the discussion, the President of one of the bank's most profitable divisions opined that less than $10 billion in assets was the "dead zone". They had to grow to survive.

I challenged the thinking. But he held firm that the regulatory environment, changing customer preferences, and the pace and expense of technology were driving the market towards bigger is better. In that, I thought, he has a point.

But I'm always looking for support. This blog has dug deep into the numbers to support the notion that bigger is better. I spoke of the best performing FIs in ROA (see link here), and how growth impacted expense and efficiency ratios (see link here). Neither supported this regional president's opinion.

This time, I searched for the top five best performing FIs by total return to shareholders over the past five years. After all, what is the point of becoming big if you cannot deliver value to shareholders? I used two filters: the FI had to trade over 2,000 shares per day so there is some level of efficiency in the stock (this created a larger FI bias in so doing); and the FI could not have a mutual-to-stock conversion during that period, which muddies the waters.

I will review my top five in descending order. Last post was dedicated to the #5 Bank, German American Bancorp of Jasper, Indiana (see post here). The rest of this post goes to our number 4 bank:

#4: Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. (Nasdaq: OZRK) of Little Rock, Arkansas

Over a 100-year banking history, Bank of the Ozarks expanded from its headquarters in Little Rock, Arkansas, to more than 100 locations throughout the Southeast and is consistently ranked among the top performing banks in America (see chart).

Bank of the Ozarks began in 1903 as a small community bank in Jasper, Arkansas, and by 1937, included an additional bank in Ozark, Arkansas. In 1979, George Gleason, a 25-year-old attorney, purchased controlling interest and assumed active management of the bank as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer. At the time, the bank had a couple dozen employees and total assets of $28 million.

What is interesting about the success of Bank of the Ozarks and its CEO is the fact that he wasn't the "experienced banker" regulators almost insist upon when approving the appointment of bank leadership. There are plenty of sad stories of bank demise at the hands of experienced bankers. Bank of the Ozarks and their regulators were not so myopic in their view. If our industry is to change, then who should be change agents?

In 1994, with a total of five banking offices in rural Arkansas markets, Bank of the Ozarks launched an aggressive growth strategy to expand the number of banking offices and product and service offerings. Collectively, the management team built an Arkansas franchise rivaling the largest banks in the state. The company moved its headquarters to Little Rock in 1995. The company held its initial public offering of stock in 1997. Since that time, the company has grown to more than 100 locations throughout Arkansas, Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama and Florida.

How did they grow so quickly? They acquired seven failed institutions in Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina from the FDIC, adding over $2 billion of acquired assets since March 2010. Such aggressive growth has led to positive operating leverage as net income and EPS has grown faster than assets (see table from their investor presentation).

Bank of the Ozarks has historically been a very good performer as they grew and prior to their recent FDIC deal binge. Their ROA in 2006 when their assets were $2.5 billion was 1.24%. Aided by the FDIC transactions and as a result of disciplined execution of those deals and the accounting of those transactions, OZRK is now a $4.0 billion bank with a 3.60% ROA year to date.

The eye-popping ROA is partially a result of the increased net interest margin, presently 5.67%, due to the accounting of the acquired loans from the FDIC. This margin will drop off as the discounted loans accrete, but if past is prologue OZRK will be well positioned to continue its historic superior performance.

So to summarize, Bank of the Ozarks Inc. achieved superior financial performance by embracing a young, forward looking CEO that clearly has a bent for successful execution. FDIC assisted transactions doubled the size of the institution, and the challenge for the next five years is how well the management team can run a much larger, and geographically sprawling franchise.

Congratulations to Bank of the Ozarks. They rank #4 in total return to shareholders over the past five years. So far, our list is:

#4: Bank of the Ozarks, Inc.
#5: German American Bancorp

~ Jeff

Note: I make no investment recommendations in my blog. Please do not claim to invest in any security based on what you read here. You should make your own decisions in that regard. My wife won't let me buy bank stocks without her permission, so why would you buy based on what I write?

Top 5 Total Return to Shareholders: #5 - German American Bancorp

I was recently moderating a strategic planning discussion with a multi-billion dollar in assets financial institution. During the discussion, the President of one of the bank's most profitable divisions opined that less than $10 billion in assets was the "dead zone". They had to grow to survive.

I challenged the thinking. But he held firm that the regulatory environment, changing customer preferences, and the pace and expense of technology were driving the market towards bigger is better. In that, I thought, he has a point.

But I'm always looking for support. This blog has dug deep into the numbers to support the notion that bigger is better. I spoke of the best performing FIs in ROA (see link here), and how growth impacted expense and efficiency ratios (see link here). Neither supported this regional president's opinion.

This time, I searched for the top five best performing FIs by total return to shareholders over the past five years. After all, what is the point of becoming big if you cannot deliver value to shareholders? I used two filters: the FI had to trade over 2,000 shares per day so there is some level of efficiency in the stock (this created a larger FI bias in so doing); and the FI could not have a mutual-to-stock conversion during that period, which muddies the waters.

I will review my top five in descending order. The rest of this post goes to our number 5 bank:

#5: German American Bancorp, Inc. (Nasdaq: GABC) of Jasper, Indiana

German American is a 100-year old, $1.8 billion in assets bank servicing the businesses, citizens, and communities of Southern Indiana. Upon reviewing their investor presentations, annual reports, and financials, it is clear they are a conservatively managed, geographically focused financial institution. There is no discernible niche strategy to differentiate them from competitors. The chart below demonstrates total return versus an industry and general market index.

However, the past three years have proven to be the best three in their 100-year history. Not only did they survive the financial crisis, they found a way to thrive. Net interest income grew over $10 billion when comparing 2007 to 2010, while non-interest expense grew less than $5 billion. That is positive operating leverage driven by core banking during a period when FI earnings growth is driven more by a lower loan loss provision and not top line growth.

GABC continues to look for opportunities for growth. According to their investor presentation, growth opportunities were greater in nearby markets than their legacy markets (see chart below). To thrive into the future, the bank is executing on a three-pronged strategy in addition to maintaining their market share in legacy markets.

First was a strategy where management exercises the greatest control... de novo expansion. Second was a branch acquisition that added $50 million in deposits and $44 million in loans in markets where the bank desired to grow. Lastly, they acquired a $300 million financial institution, giving them strong market share in Evansville and surrounding communities.

Upon reviewing the pricing of that transaction, their first since 2005 and the largest in their history, I thought they overpaid. But in reading the summary to the issued proxy statement from that transaction, it was clear that the structure of the transaction was designed to 1) get the prize, and 2) make it as accretive as possible given the competition (or the perceived competition) for the target. Two years from now, nobody is going to remember the price-to-book GABC paid compared to other M&A deals of the day.

Indeed, the transaction closed this year on New Year's Day, and GABC's EPS annual run rate of $1.52 is 26% higher than 2010 EPS. Non-interest expense to average assets is lower for the first six months of 2011 compared to the 2010 year. The bank has achieved positive operating leverage as a result of their acquisition strategy and has positioned themselves for further expansion into new markets.

The result: yes they are bigger. No they are not big. And yes their shareholders should be pleased.  

~ Jeff

Note: I make no investment recommendations in my blog. Please do not claim to invest in any security based on what you read here. You should make your own decisions in that regard. My 401(k) year to date return is -5.56%. Need I say more?

Does your strategy drive your structure? I doubt it.

A few weeks ago I taught Bank Organizational Structure at the North Carolina Bankers Association School of Banking. The School is divided into four classes: Freshman, Sophomore, etc. My course was to the Freshman class.

But the class was very diverse, ranging from junior level people to Senior Vice Presidents. This presents a challenge. Part of my task was to demonstrate “how it is” in organizational structure. This part of the class may not have been very interesting to the more seasoned bankers.

As part of the “how it is” discussion, I outlined org structures evolved to where we are today by:

1. Past experience of Board members and/or Management;

2. Legacy structure… the way it has always been;

3. Entitlement structure… making management positions and reporting lines to promote key managers; and

4. Regulatory requirements… maintaining certain Board and management committees, processes, and policies.

These key drivers resulted in most financial institutions being organized by product group, in my experience. For example, there would be a Senior Lender that has commercial, consumer, and residential loans reporting to them. This puts staff serving very diverse customer groups with different needs reporting to one executive, who is charged with serving only a portion of their need.

The second part of my topic revolved around the evolution of org structures. What if, I posited, a bank were to organize around customers instead of products? See my post a few months back relating to this topic and a Forrester Research study here. Shouldn’t the FIs strategy drive its structure? How would such a structure look? This was probably more interesting to the seasoned bankers, because it challenged how we are typically organized.

We did an exercise regarding a bank, called “Blue Collar Bank (BCB)”, that wanted to focus on working class families. How would such a bank be organized around the needs of its niche customer base, I asked the class?

The results were interesting. The two students that presented their org structure to the class separated support and line functions. This is not atypical to how we do it today. But neither student separated out lending from deposit gathering. Credit, as I recall, was separated out by one student but not the other.

It was interesting that the responsibility for serving all of the niche customers’ needs channeled up to one executive. There were specialties within that line of reporting, but there was no passing the ball across the organizational continuum, as is typical today. This passing of the ball leads to holes in customers being served. In countless strategy sessions FIs struggle with who is going to serve small businesses… the branches or the lenders?

For example: a long time ago I was a branch manager for a commercial bank. Any commercial loan referrals were passed across the org structure to the commercial lending line of business. One customer wanted to expand his car wash by one bay and was seeking financing. I phoned into the commercial department, where the loan officer told me to “not bother him with this sh**.” My guess is he was busy working million dollar deals and didn’t want to be bothered with a $50,000 one. Because I continue to hear this in FI strategy sessions, I don’t think this is unusual, even today.

But would such a reaction be unusual if the bank was organized by customer? After the class, a student from Newbridge Bancorp in Greensboro approached me to proudly hand me her bank’s quarterly financial report. It had the bank’s org structure (see photo below and link here). This bank is organized differently than most, and is more closely aligned around customers versus products.

Could aligning structure with strategy be the next step in changing the culture in community FIs? What do you think?

~ Jeff

Bank Shorts: Sales Culture Gone Wild

When I was a branch manager, I fondly recall competing with a friend and fellow branch manager for the quarterly sales title. My bank, First National Bank of Maryland, had a very transparent incentive compensation system. I could calculate my own and my team's quarterly bonuses to the penny. It was called RAISE... Recognizing Achievement In Sales Excellence.

The challenge was that it was a sales incentive system. So we sold. This may have motivated us to focus on the product de jour rather than customer needs. I think my friend and I were conscientious enough leaders to mitigate this risk. But it did cause us to focus on the types of customers likely to "buy" promoted products and not focus on the bank's strategy.

Enjoy the Bank Short below. If your incentive system revolves around sales versus profitability, then don't be surprised if this is going on in your branches.

Bank Shorts: Sales culture gone wild.
by: jeffmarsico

Cars: A Lesson in Brand Identity

A few weeks ago I was driving the Pennsylvania Turnpike when I noticed a sweet ride. Deep black, with flecks of blue, tan leather interior, advanced looking dash, and a pretty, well-dressed lady in the passenger seat to boot. I thought to myself, "what a handsome and successful couple". The car, as emblazoned on the trunk, was a "Genesis"... the beginning... awesome name.

I looked up the car later in the week. It is made by Hyundai. I thought "maybe that couple isn't so successful after all". The lightbulb atop my head went off, sirens blaring, slightly embarrassed by my reaction, but I think I had a blog post! My opinion of this couple, a couple I have never met, was significantly influenced by the car they drove. I promised myself I would swim in deeper waters in the future.

Is my reaction unique? When I transitioned from banking to bank consulting in 1997, I drove up to my new office with great anticipation. I was anxious to get started. My car... a Mitsubishi Eclipse. On that day, my boss matter-of-factly informed me that I would have to get another vehicle. He drove a Volvo.

When I coached my daughter's club softball team, I was in charge of finances. Funny how this banking thing bleeds into your personal life. But one family was persistently late making their fee payments. I caucused with the other coaches to see if we should cut them some slack. Cutting slack meant the other families would have to pay a little more to support the family having difficulty. We decided against it when the father pulled up in a Cadillac Escalade.

I don't think cars influencing our opinions of others is unique to me.

This causes some people great difficulty, including me. I grew up in a blue collar family. The first family car I remember was the Dodge Dart Swinger. As I moved through my professional life, my family income has naturally gone up. But my upbringing does not permit me to spend $20,000 more on a car just so people can think well of me. Look at the cars of other consultants, you'll find the Volvo's, BMW's, and Infinity's. I drive a Dodge. But not the famed Dart Swinger!

I witness many friends and colleagues spend suitcases of cash on vehicles. Some are spending cash they do not have. No matter what math you use, it does not make financial sense to drive a "status" car. And yet many do. I think there is a strong lesson here for financial institutions.

There are countless resources for FIs to research how to appropriately position their brand. Maybe we are looking at this the wrong way. Perhaps we should build a brand that enhances the brand of our target customers?

For example, after a bank board of directors meeting a few years ago, a director approached me on a different topic regarding something his Merrill Lynch broker told him. This bank had a significant Trust Department, and one of their directors had his money at Merrill Lynch. It almost felt like he wanted me to know he was a Merrill client. In the eyes of the director, Merrill Lynch elevated HIS brand. Wonder what he thinks of them now!

Getting closer to home, listen to how friends and colleagues discuss coffee. Some go to the break room and pour a free cup. Others go to Starbucks, often saying "I need my Starbucks". Their Starbucks? Again, this could be a case of a company elevating the personal brand of their customers.

The proliferation of Starbucks outlets has made drinking their coffee less exclusive, and therefore lessens their ability to elevate customers' personal brands. CEO Howard Schultz readily admits they diminished their brand by opening too many stores. Fortunately for personal brand builders, they keep their price points high so schleps like me gravitate to Mickey D's.

If the question about brand changes from building the brand of the FI to building the brand of the FIs customers, what changes need to be made? If our target customers are small businesses, how do we position the FI in such a manner that the small business person is proud to proclaim that we are their bank? And if we position ourselves as customer brand builders, do we have the courage to focus on our target customers to the exclusion of other customers that are valuable to us, but not our strategic focus?

It would be writing the obvious to say that banking is at a crossroads. History and culture did not require us to position our FI for anything other than locational convenience and efficient transaction processing. Now, we must be unique, be focused, have purpose. Much like Harley Davidson, our customers should be fiercely loyal to us because we mean something to them. We build their personal brand.

I think my next car will be a muscle car. Beats going to the gym.

What are your thoughts of brand building focusing on customers instead of our institutions?

~ Jeff

Back of the Envelope: Branch Acquisition Math Made Easy

On Sunday, July 31st, First Niagara Financial Group Inc. ($30.89 billion) agreed to buy 195 Northeast branches with approximately $15 billion in deposits from HSBC Holdings Plc for an approximate 6.67% deposit premium. During a conference call the next day, First Niagara President and CEO John Koelmel said the bank will divest 100 of the branches and will likely sell about two-thirds of the divested branches and close the others.

Aside from making the announcement on a Sunday, it is odd to strike a deal only to have to divest over half of the bounty. But the branch divestiture has some upstate New York financial institutions circling branches like hyenas around a wildebeest.

Branch purchases are on the mind of many CEOs these days as a means to accelerate growth to achieve the perceived scale necessary to absorb increasing, non value added costs such as compliance and systems security. Nobody knows how big they have to be, just bigger. Sort of like professional baseball players in the late 90's.

But it is not important enough to just be big. As noted in a prior post regarding how FIs failed to reduce expense and efficiency ratios as they grew (see link below), it is more important to be smart than big. Take this from one who invested some of my daughter's college money in Sovereign Bank, a bank that prayed at the altar of bigger is better, only to have me work harder to fund the money I lost. The lakehouse will have to wait.

Analyzing the impact of a branch purchase is not particularly complicated. I ran a hypothetical analysis on the back of an envelope for Schmidlap National Bank buying a $50 million in deposits branch from First Niagara (see photo).

Counter-intuitive for those not initiated in branch purchase is that the buyer actually receives funds.  For example, if Schmidlap buys $50 million in deposits for a $1 million premium and the value of the fixed assets of the branch (including real estate, tables, desks, everything except the signs) was $2 million, Schmidlap would get a check for $47 million at closing from First Niagara.

Except if you listen to some of my early adopter bank marketing or IT friends, First Niagara would more likely remit payment via a QR code on their smart phone.

Schmidlap would have to pay the interest expense on all $50 million of deposits. They would also have to amortize the premium paid over some period. In this hypothetical case, it amortizes straight line over 10 years. There are limited exceptions to having to amortize the entire premium. And First Niagara may very well be able to put some of their premium paid in goodwill. But when acquiring only one branch, such as what Schmidlap is doing, it is likely the whole premium will be amortized. This is a non-cash charge, but an expense nonetheless.

Since Schmidlap only receives $47 million in net proceeds, that is what they have to invest in either loans or the investment portfolio. Yields on bank qualified investments are so low these days, that for any branch purchase to be anything more than a single at best, the buyer would hope to deploy proceeds in loans. In Schmidlap's case, we assume that they can put the net proceeds to work at 3% and the deposits cost 1%.

When all is said and done, this branch purchase will only drop $385,000 to pre-tax profit. Readers may think that $385k is better than nothing. But this represents only 0.77% pre-tax return on assets. If Schmidlap has a better ratio at time of closing, than this transaction would bring their pre-tax ROA down.  If the bank allocated $4 million of capital (an 8% leverage ratio) to support the branch, that would yield a 9.63% pre-tax return on equity.

Not exactly a home run, would you agree? But Schmidlap would be bigger, just not better. Or am I looking at it wrong? Doesn't bigger equate to better? Barry Bonds thinks so.

~ Jeff

Does your bank achieve positive operating leverage? Post regarding expense & efficiency ratios:
http://jeff-for-banks.blogspot.com/2011/05/does-your-bank-achieve-positive.html

V-blog: From the desk of jfb. How should FIs use social media?

Financial Brand August 2010 Survey of Banks Social Media Presence
http://thefinancialbrand.com/13111/2010-bank-credit-union-online-marketing-study/

Frank Sorrentino’s (Twitter: @franksiii) Blog
http://www.bankingonmainstreet.com/

Susquehanna Bank’s blog
http://blog.susquehanna.net/

Chase’s Community Giving Facebook page
http://www.facebook.com/ChaseCommunityGiving